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The purpose of this study is to present a narrative and analysis of
United StatesMexican relations from 1933 to 192*1 in connection with the
Good Neighbor policy of the United States. Hie writer will attempt to show
that, in adherence to the Good Neighbor policy, the United States not only re
fused to intervene in Mexico during the period under consideration but strove
diligently to be a good neighbor in its dealings with the republic to the
south. Situations did, however, arise which at other times might have given
rise to United States intervention.
The data for this study have come from public documents, books,
articles, and speeches. Wiile considerable material is available on the
subject, this work is significant because it gives a short yet comprehen
sive account of the salient issues in the diplomatic relations between the
two countries during the period when the Good Neighbor policy was put to a
severe test by Mexico.
This work is divided into four chapters. As a means of providing the
reader with perspective and a frame of reference, the first chapter reviews
briefly the Mexican Revolution and the Good Neighbor policy because the major
issues in the diplomatic relations between the two nations grew out of the
Revolution. The adherence to the Good Neighbor policy by the United States
greatly aided in settling these issues. The second chapter discusses the
claims of American citizens against the Mexican government which arose after
1868, the settlement of which Josephus Daniels, the United States Ambassador
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to Meacico, referred to as the "first fruit" of the Good Neighbor policy.
The last two chapters give an account of the two aspects of the ReTolution
that chiefly conflicted with .American property rights, namely, the expro
priation of American agrarian and oil properties. TnJhile presenting the
material of this study in four separate chapters, the writer has also at
tempted to treat each issue in a logical and chronological order.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION AND THE GOOD
NEIGHBOR POLICY
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was launched against a system which had
been largely constructed by Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911) and his supporters.
During his regime, Diaz smothered all attempted revolutionary strife even
tshen it was done at the price of individual liberty and he supported a socio-
economic situation for the masses which was closely akin to serfdom. In an
effort to advance the material progress of Mexico, the dictator invited
foreign capital to eacploit its natural resources and to organize its econom
ic life. These invitations were made with alien business men who received
broad and frequently lavish concessions. These concessions to foreigners a-
roused a smoldering popular hostility which Diaa for many years suppressed.^
While the system created by D^ag produced order and outward evidence
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of prosperity, the masses were landless and poverty stricken. The profits
from the foreign concessions paid the fees of a small group of Mexican law
yers, bureaucrats, and politicians who lived in Mexico Gityj provided the
salary of young foreign engineers! enlarged the estates of foreign residentsj
or flowed abroad as dividends to stockholders. There was almost no progress
^Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (Mew York,
19S>0), pp. 51iO4il. Hereafter cited as A DipToroatio History." "
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Thomas A. Bailey, AJDiplomatic History of the American People (New
York, 1950), p. 602. ——•——-—----—-----—--——--—--———
in education, public welfare, and social improvement.
Beginning as a revolt against the dictatorship of Diaz, the Mexican
Revolution of 1910 had as its immediate objective the restoration of the
constitutional liberties which had been ruthlessly suppressed by Diag
In the early days of the movement, the intellectuals and the politicians
were mainly concerned over the issues of good government, honesty in poli
tics, and justice before the courts. The underlying movement of the rural
folk gradually submerged all else and subordinated all other issues to the
basic one of land for the people. Consequently by 1915, the aims of the
Revolution had shifted to an effort to improve the lot of the peasants and
workers in Mexico. A prerequisite for such improvement was the Mexican re
covery of the control of the Important elements of Mexico's natural resour
ces which had passed into the possession of foreigners. Thus the Revolution
took on a "Mexico for the Mexicans" coloration.^
The Revolution began under the leadership of Francisco I. Madero who
was the presidential candidate of the Anti-Re-eleetionist Party in the Mex
ican general elections of 1910. A few days before elections, Madero was im
prisoned on charges of inciting the nation to armed revolt. Wxen Diaz later
permitted Madero to "escape" from his confinement in San Luis Potosf and to
seek exile ±n the United States, the election results were released. Accord
ing to the official figure, Diaa was victorious over his opponents and plans
T3emis, op. eit., pp.
23Md., p.
Tanneribaum, Mexico i The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New
York, 1950), p. 02. " -—-——--——---—--—-—-—-
W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (New York,
1955), pp. 616-17. —— ___
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were laid to inaugurate Mm in November.
After he entered Texas, Madero issued a manifesto known as the "Plan
of Luis Potosi" which touched off the Resolution. In this manifesto,
Madero called for the nullification of the July elections as fraudulent and a
denial of the people's will. He called for the Me3d.ean people to remit
against Diaz and set November 20, 1910 (later the official starting date of
the Revolution) as the day for a mass uprising. He named himself provision-
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al president and promised that new and honest elections would follow.
Tiny bands of devoted Maderistas rallied to the "Plan of San Luis
Potosi." Premature outbreaks occurred on November 18, 1910 and sporadie
local fighting continued thereafter at widely separate points in the repub
lic. Finally, on May 25, 1911* Bias was forced to resign. He was eaciled to
Europe where he died in 1$2$*
Madero took office on November 6, 1911. After being installed in
power, he allowed his political foes complete use of the new liberties.^ In
February, 1913* President Madero was overthrown by a coup d'etat led by Felix
Dia$, a nephew of the old dictatorj and Victorian© Huerta,-3 and assassinated
a short time later along with his Vice-President, Jose Maria Pino Suarez.




^Tanneribaum, op. eit.a p. 56.
George J. Rausoh, Jr., "The &d.le and Death of Victoriano Huerta,"
Higganig_American Historical Review, XUI (May, 1962), 133.
"Tanneribaum, op. eit., p. $6,
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The reactionary regime of Yietoriano Huerta came to power in Febru
ary, 1913 and maintained itself to July, I9U4. His regime represented a
©ounter-revolution and it appeared likely that his success would restore a
dictatorship, and presumably law and order. The Huerta government, how
ever, was denied recognition by the United States under President Woodrowr
Wilson because Wilson was convinced that Huerta was personally responsible
for the murder of Madero. While no proof of his responsibility has appear
ed, his guilt was widely accepted and several groups arose in armed opposi
tion to him. A deadly but indecisive period of civil war followed between
the troops of Huerta and those of fenustiano Garran&a, Francisco filla, and
Emiliano Zapata. By the middle of Ju3y, 1911*, Huertars position had become
impossible. He resigned his office and fled the country in July, 19Uj..2
Following Huerta's downfall, the government of Mexico came under the
control of Carranza but the elimination of Huerta did not bring peace to
Mexico. Rival revolutionary armies ravaged -fee country. The most outstand
ing armies were those under Zapata in the southwest and Villa in the north.
The United States recognized Garramsa's authority on October 19, 1915. The
Mexican Congress, acting as an electoral college, finally elected Carranza
as President on March 11, 1917. It also adopted a new constitution. The
principal object of the document was to re-establish Mexican mastery over
the land and natural resources which had been largely alienated to foreign
ers under the regime of Dias. The United States recognised the new govern
ment de jure on April 17, 1917.^
^Samuel F. Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Poliey and Dip-
Ipmacjr (New York, 1959), p. 3Z£. Hereafter cited as A Short History.'
£Rausch, op. cit., p. 133.
, A Short History, pp. 331-3U.
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Sinee Garranza proved more ready to proclaim the revolutionary reforms
than to execute them and because he was ruthless and corrupt, his government
was overthrown and he was murdered in 1920 in a new uprising led by General
Alvaro Obregon who became president of the Republic.
A regime of orderly government began with Obregon in 1920 and ended
the violent Revolution.2 Erom 1920 through 1933, the chief problems in
Mexico were reconstruction and rehabilitation especially of the political
machinery. The old apparatus that had served Bias not only was discredited,
but had nearly been blotted out in the decade of civil war. From 1933
through I9I4O, the Revolution went through a renaissance and a resurgence
which shook structures of politics, economics, and social life to their very
foundations.^
The decade of revolution produced issues that were to affect diplo
matic relations between the United States and Mexico. These issues grew out
of the following? (1) claims for damages to Imerican citizens suffered
since the creation of the last mixed commission of 1868 which settled routine
claims under international law and treaty provisions, (2) claims for damages
to American citizens and their property by reason of the associated violence
or arbitrary decrees issued during the Revolution, (3) claims for damages
for the expropriation of Mexican lands owned by United Slates citizens in
good legal title, and (U) claims for damages by American citizens by virtue
of the Mexican nationalization of the subsoil deposits on United States
d., p. 326.
2Ibid.
-'Cline, op. pit., pp. 56~57.
owned properties aceording to the provisions of Article 2? of the new Mexi
can Constitution of 1917.*
The United States Government's Good Neighbor policy, as developed by
the Roosevelt administration, played a great part in bringing about mutually
satisfying solutions to these issues. Because of the significant role it
played in United States-Mexican relations, a brief review of some aspects of
the Good Neighbor policy is necessary.
Nonintervention in the domestic affairs of the Latin .American countries
is the first and most essential principle of the Good Neighbor policy of the
Roosevelt administration. The United States Government had begun to develop
this principle before the advent of the Roosevelt administration. All that
remained for the chief executive was to give nonintervention the status of a
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systematic policy and to implement its ideas. The understanding of the
Good Neighbor policy as it emerged during the presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt can be clarified by a brief review of United States relation® with
Latin America.
When first announced, over a century ago, the Monroe Doctrine was a
notice to Europe to keep hands off the independent states of the Western
Hemisphere. At that time, there was no thought that the United States it
self would intervene in the affairs of Latin America yet this particular
development or extension of the Monroe Doctrine was brought about by Presi
dent Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was
the outgrowth of disturbed conditions in Latin American countries which led
, A Short History^ pp. 33U-35.
^Norman A. Graebner (ed.)* An Uncertain Traditions American Secretar
ies of State in the Twentieth Century (NeJ"Tork, 1961), p. 19b. ~~"™
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to threats of European intervention for the maintenance of order and the
collection of debts. The United States was faced with three possible
courses of action if Latin American countries allowed their affairs to fall
into such conditions of chaos and disorder that they apparently could not
be straightened out except through the intervention of some other power.
In the first place, the United States Government could stand idly by and
permit European nations to intervene. But this did not seem to be a cor
rect attitude for the United States to assume because it would clearly be
a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Secondly, it could maintain the posi
tion of not allowing Europeans to intervene and of not intervening itself.
This course seemed to hold out no hope for an improvement of conditions.
The third possible course was for the United States itself to intervene.
This was the course which President Theodore Roosevelt adopted.1 With
respect to intervention, Roosevelt declared in his annual message to Con
gress in 1901ij
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable effi
ciency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps
order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the
United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in
a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America,
as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized
nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United
States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to
the exercise of an international police power.2
Thus he explained what was later called the Roosevelt Corollary to the Mon
roe Doctrine. In its essence this policy turned out to be one of imperiaHsia
. Mathews, "Roosevelt's Latin-American Policy," American Poj.it-
ical Science, Review, XXIX (October, 1935), 806-07.
^Willis F. Johnson (ed.), Theodore Roosevelt—Addresses and Papers
(New York, 1910), p. 231. — —- - —— —
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or of what in this country is sometimes called the policy of the Big
Stick.1
In accord with this eorollary of the Monroe Doctrine, mounting debtss
long unpaid, finaUy led the United States into a series of interventions
in the republics to the south. A convention was adopted with the Dominican
Republic which established a customs receivership there under an American
fiscal officer. This officer was named by the President of the United
States and acted under the protection of the United States navy.-' Condi
tions of anarchy in the Republic resulted in military occupation up to
192lj.. This Idnd of positive implementation of the Monroe Doctrine was con
tinued in force until the middle of the Hoover administration. The Taft
administration, for eaeample, negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua similar to
that with the Dominican Republic and, when obstacles to its execution arose,
landed marines who stayed there with a brief interruption until 1933• The
Wilson administration, in its turn, intervened in Haiti in 1915 and there
the marines remained until ±93k> None of these interventions was accom
plished without resistance.^ The Caribbean region came to be regarded as
an area for exploitation by American business interests assisted by the
government of the United States under the principle of "dollar diplomacy."
As late as 1928, at the Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana, the United
■Wfchews, op. cit., p0 807.
^Samuel F. Bemis (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy (New York, 1958), X, 118-19.
thews, op. eit., p. 80?.
**Deacter Perkins, The United States and Latin America (Baton Rouge,
1961), p. 6h.
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insisted on maintaining the right of intervention.1
President Hoover appreciated the significance of the good will and
understanding of our American neighbors for the security of the United
States. He also did not fail to see the damage which had resulted from th©
policies carried on by his predecessors. Prior to his inauguration, there
fore, he undertook a good-will tour around Central and South .America. His
intentions were admirable and under different conditions would have result-
ed in much good but he failed to succeed in his purpose.
About midway the Hoover administration, a series of incidents revealed
that there was a change of policy on the part of the United States. First,
when a revolution occurred in Panama in 1931, the United States did not in
tervene in spite of our right to do so under the treaty of 1903. Second,
when El Salvador defaulted on her bonds in 1932, the State Department mad©
no move to assist the bankers by establishing a customs receivership.
Third, in Nicaragua, the number of Marines was gradually reduced and final
ly, early in 1933, those remaining were withdrawn altogether. Fourth, dur
ing th© Hoover administration, J. Rueben Clark, Undersecretary of State,
prepared a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine—which memorandum declared the
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine unwarranted and characterized
the doctrine as a policy of the United States toward Europe and not toward
Latin America. In spite of the various steps taken by the Hoover adminis
tration showing a more conciliatory spirit toward Latin America he failed to
create an impression of the United States as a good neighbor. In his book,
Tfethews, op. cit., p. 80?.
2Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York, 19U0, PP« 189-90.
%athews, op. eit., pp. 807-08.
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Time for Decision, Sumner Welles stated the following:
It is an obvious fact that after four years of the Hoover admin
istration there was no country in the Western Hemisphere where the
United States was, in even the most superficial sense of the word.
regarded as a good neighbor.1
While Hoover was neither unaware of nor indifferent to the issue,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognised more keenly the importance of a
good will policy as a means of hemispheric solidarity.2 During the months
between his nomination and inauguration, Roosevelt made it a practice to
invite a group of advisers to visit him at Albany or Hyde Park in order to
review withMm questions of domestic and foreign policy. As an outgrowth
of one of these meetings, during which questions of hemispheric policy was
discussed, Sunnier Welles sent the President a memorandum on inter-American
relations in which he stated?
The creation and maintenance of the most cordial and intimate re
lationship between the United States and the other republics of the
American Continent must be regarded as a keystone of our foreign policy.
The erroneous interpretations given to the Monroe Doctrine over a period
of many decades have constituted a constant cause for apprehension and
for misrepresentation of the true purpose of the government of the
United States.3
The memorandum represents th© thinking of one of Roosevelt's most trusted
advisers in the field of inter-American relations in the days immediately
preceding the announcement of the Good Neighbor policy.
Die Good Neighbor policy, under the guidance and direction of President
2Louis M. Sears, "The Roosevelt Foreign Policy. 1937-191*0.« Journal of
Modern History, XT (March, 19k3)s 52-£3. ——-
3
Charles C. Griffin (ed.), "Welles to Roosevelts Memorandum on Inter-
American Relations, 1933," Higganie American Historical Review. XXXIV (May,
19ft), 190-91. —^— 9
13
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, rapidly de
veloped to include the doctrine of nonintervention. This achievement
evolved through spe@eb.es of the United States chief executive, through suc
cessive acts of policy, and in inter-American conferences.^- The most im
portant reasons for a change in United States policy toward latin America
include (1) the lack of danger of European intervention in Latin America^
(2) the gradually increasing stability of the Latin American countries and
their increasing ability on the whole to keep their houses in order,
(3) the effect of the economic depression in the United States and the reed
for this country to cultivate the good will of Latin America as a stimulant
to international trade, and (k) the greater realisation on the part of the
United States of the right of Latin Americans to be allowed to work out
2
their own destiny without unnecessary interference by the United States.
President Roosevelt carried out th© policy of good neighborliness
more fully than any of his predecessors and, in his official utterances,
made it more clear cut and explicit. In hi® First Inaugural Address on
March k, 1933, he atateds
In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the
policy of th© good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects him
self and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his
agreements in and with a world of neighbors.3
In an address before the special session of the Governing Board of
Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New
York, 19h3), p. 256. Hereafter cited as~Xatin American Policy.'
2
Mathews, gPj^jsit., p. 8l?.
^Samuel I. Boseaman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Frank
lin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1938),"'JH, 'lit. ~"^ ' ' ——
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the Pan .American Union on the occasion of the celebration of Pan-American
Day in Washington on April 12, 1933s Roosevelt enlarged upon the statement
made in his First Inaugural Address:
The essential qualities of a true Pan Americanism must be the same
as those •which constitute a good neighbor,, namely, mutual understand
ing, and, through such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of
the other's point of view. It is only in this manner that ire can hope
to build a system of which confidence, friendship and good-will are
the cornerstones.1
President Roosevelt, in his address before the Woodrow Wilson Found
ation in Washington, on December 28, 1933 enlarged still further upon the
Good Neighbor policy when he stated that
the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to
armed intervention.
The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is
not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone* The
maintenance of law and of the orderly processes of government in this
hemisphere is the concern of each individual Nation within its own
borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly
processes affect the other Nations of the Continent that it becomes
their concernj and the point to stress is that in such event it be
comes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all
neighbors.2
This statement represents a fundamental change in the application of the
Monroe Doctrine as it had been understood since the time of President
Theodore Roosevelt. It suggested a continentalized interpretation of the
Doctrine for the first time in an official presidential statement.^
Latin American fears of intervention by the United States were not
allayed by the friendly speeches of President Hoover and Roosevelt. For
some time after Hoover's good-will tour in 1928, Latin Americans demanded
1Ibid., p. 130.
2Ibid., p. $k$*
^Mathews, op. cit., p. 810.
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deeds in addition to words as evidence of the good faith of the United
States. They insisted that the policy of nonintervention be elected to
the level of a legaUy binding pledge of nonintervention. The Latin-Amerl-
can demand had been successfully resisted by Charles E. Hughes at the Sixth
International Conference of American States in 1928?■ The refusal of the
United States to renounce the right to intervene in Latin America had em
bittered the republics to the south to a degree little realised by the
average American citizen when Roosevelt became President in 1933. The at
titude of Latin America toward intervention was reflected by Luis Quintan-
ilia, Mexican diplomat, when he said?
In the previous fifty years [before 1933J, the United States had
intervened some sixty times in the affairs and territories of its
Latin American neighbors—especially in the Caribbean....How can one
apeak of inter-American solidarity, Pan Americanism^ or Good Neigh-
borlinesa when the stumbling block in the path of good relations was
nothing less than the most powerful republic of the Hemisphere? The
situation eould change only if and when the United States decided to
abandon once and for all its imperialistic interventionisnu*
The Latin American fear of United States intervention was allayed
somewhat in 1933 at the Seventh International Conference of American States
held at Montevideo, During this conference the policy of nonintervention,
the capstone of the Good Neighbor policy, was accepted by the United States
with reservations. The nonintervention policy became a part of the Confer
ences Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. United States Secre
tary of State Hull's reservation meant that while the United States
Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York, 1961),
p. 118. —» _ . _ 1
2Luis Quintanilla, AL^t^Ameriean^ea^ (Mew York, 191*3), pp. 156-
57. —__—
^Edward 0. Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque,
1950), p. 2. -_-___-_____jl
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renounced the use of force in regard to domestic political affairs in Latin
America it was not yet ready in a legally binding way to renounce the use
of force for the protection of the lives or property of United States
citizens in Latin America. The United States could have taken no one step
that would have more completely allayed the suspicions and antagonism of
its Jtaeriean neighbors. Sumner Welles believed that "it was the first great
step toward the construction of the new inter-American relationship.2
The months following the Montevideo Conference were a critical period.
Any refusal of the United States to observe the letter and spirit of the
Convention on Rights and Duties of States would have destroyed all the pro
gress thus far made in the development of the Good Neighbor Policy. Cuba
became the testing ground of the good neighbor's sincerity by demanding the
abrogation of the Cuban-American Treaty of 1903. This treaty embodied the
Platt .Amendment that gave the United States a legal right to intervene in
the internal and external affairs of the republic. Hull, on May 19, 193k$
signed a treaty formally abrogating the Platt Amendment and ending all
special rights in Cuba except the right to maintain a naval ba se at Guan-
tanamo.^
After the withdrawal of the United States from Cuba, there still re
mained three Caribbean countries--Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Pana
ma—in which the United States might legally intervene to protect property
and maintain order. By special agreement with the Haitian Government, Amer
ican marines were withdrawn from that country on August 15, I93h. Moreover,
¥ood» op- c±t.3 p. 119.
2
^Welles, op. cit.j p. 200.
^Arthur S. Link, An American Epoch (New York, 1955), p. 1|57.
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the United States allowed the Haitian-American Treaty of 1916, which had
made Haiti a semi-protectorate of the United States, to expire in 1936.
In 1936, Panama and the United States concluded a treaty that ended the
American right to intervene in Panamanian affairs granted in the Panaman
ian-American Treaty of 1903. The Dominican-American Treaty of 192k pro
vided for the ©ontinuation of an American receivership of the Dominican
customs after the withdrawal of American troops. This treaty was abro
gated by a new treaty between the two countries in 19U0 and the receiver
ship was ended in I9J4.I.
Despite United States withdrawals following the Montevideo Confer
ence, the United States1 reservation on intervention gave rise to a new
Latin Merican campaign for complete renunciation of the right to inter
vene. This campaign culminated at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936,.
The United States Government at this conference was fully prepared to as-
cept without reservation or protest an even stronger nonintervention obli-
2
gation. It consequently signed an Additional Protocol Relative to Nonin
tervention which stated in Article Is
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention
of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason,
in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.
The violation of th© provisions of this Article shall give rise to
mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking
methods of peaceful adjustment..3
The United States delegation made no reservation to this convention.
XIbid., pp. ii57«£8.
p
Mood, op. cit., p. U9«
^Report on the Delegation of the United States of America to the Bi
ter-American Conference;. nfor; _the ^Maintenance of Peace Buenos Aires, Argen-
Ipia, December 1-23, 1936* Depart, of State Conference Series, No. 33
(Washington,' 1937)7~PP« 127-28.
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Latin Americans were at last somewhat fully convinced that the
Roosewelt administration had completely abandoned the principle of inter
vention. Many difficulties had handicapped relations of these powers
with the United Statess but conditions by the mid-1930's were greatly im-
proved. The problems with Mexico could thus be approached with some hope
of solution.
rrant, op.cit., p. 11.
CHAPTER II
THE CLAIMS CONTROVERSY
President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew that the Good Neighbor Policy
had to be adopted by the diplomatic service of the United States in order
to become effective. He sought to send abroad men "who shared his dreams
of friendliness and who would personify the Good Neighbor doctrine in daily-
deeds as well as by official acts. Knowing of his faith in democracy
through their close association for nearly eight years in the navy during
the Wilson administration, Roosevelt asked Josephus Daniels to go to Mexi
co as his ambassador in the first days of his administration. Daniels
shared Roosevelt's feelings about the Good Neighbor Policy for he felt that
his main commission was Mto show by acts that the Good Neighbor Policy
would work,88 Daniels later repeated with pride that no other ambition in
terested him in the nearly nine years that he "walked with love among the
hospitable people of Mexico."^
Shortly after being appointed and before leaving for Mexico, Daniels
received a message from the Mexican Foreign Minister, Jose M. Puig Gasaur-
anes stating that, upon his arrifal in Mexico, it was the desire of the
Mexican Government immediately to initiate formal conversations for a lump-
sum settlement of the knotty claims controversy. Dr. Puig stressed that a




prompt solution "was "necessary to eliminate the constant tension which
hindered the most perfect cooperation between the two countries."^ Mexico
was testing the Good Neighbor policy in action*
Almost e-rosyone agreed that the claims issue had beecsne an obstacle to
elose relations between the two countries and that it should be settled.
The issue involved two general classes of claims. One was the so-called
general claims which were made reciprocally by nationals of one country
against the other for damages sustained during the period 1868 to 1910.
These were routine claims generally handled under international law and
treaty provisions. The other class was the special claims which originated
in the revolutionary period from 1910 to 1920, The more prominent claims
in this latter class included deaths, mutilations and other injuries to
persons, damages to or confiscation of property, inadequate police pro-
teetion, and denial of justice.
Settling the problems raised questions of how justice could be done to
both the American claimants and the impoverished Mexican Government. In an
attempt to reach a basis for granting diplomatic recognition to the Mexican
Government, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes agreed to the Bueareli Con
ference of 1923$ so called because the sessions were held at No. 85 Bueareli
Street in Mexico City. Here representatives of both countries met and
quietly explored their various differences. One immediate result of the
Bueareli Conference was the United States decision to grant recognition to
the Mexican Government under the presidency of Alvaro Obregon. Another re
sult was the establishment of two claims commissions of mixed memberships
2
Bends, A Diplomatic History, p. 555.
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(1) the General Claims Commission which was to adjust general claimsj
(2) the Speeial Claims Commission which was to deal with special claims.
Prior to 1932, the two commissions had made such little progress toward
a settlement that the United States claimants and the State Department
despaired of obtaining satisfaction under such a system.1
Daniels' predecessor, .Ambassador J. Reuben Clark, initiated informal
conversations looking toward an en bloe, or lump-sum, settlement similar
to those negotiated by various European governments. These lurap-?sum agree
ments had sealed down the claims for European nationals from the original
total of 382 million pesos to about 10 million pesos. While the average
return for the six nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
and Spain) involved was 2.65 per cent, the percentage of return varied from
a high of 7.92 per cent for Belgium to a low of 2.J4.6 per cent for Spain.2
President Roosevelt, Ambassador Daniels, and the State Department all
agreed by 1933 that the United States should try to get a lump-sum settle
ment of the troublesome claims issued Daniels set out for Mexico in April
of that year in the confident belief that, by doing away with the eonmis-
aions, matters which had defied solution for scores of years could be
promptly adjusted and that payment of a lump-sum was just around the corn-
er>
Understanding his instructions to mean that he was to negotiate a
lump-sum settlement of the claims issue, Daniels arrived in Mexico City on
^E. David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison, I960), p. 77.
2Ibid.
3lbid.
^Daniels, op. cit., p. 117.
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April 15, 1933. Mine days passed before he presented his credentials on
April 2ij,th. Meanwhile, on April 22nd, the Mesdeon Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Dr. Puig, delivered to Daniels a brief written memorandum cover
ing three main topicst (1) the social aims of the Revolution! (2) the
claims pending before the commissions, the friction connected with thems
and their effect on cordial relations between the two countriesj and
(3) the advantage of an en bloc settlement., It appeared that the Mexican
GofBrnment and the United States were in basic agreement on a solution to
the problem.
On April 29, Ambassador Daniels conferred with Dr. Puig. Daniels
stated that he had read his very informative memorandum and that he agreed
withhtm entirely that an en bloc settlement was the best solution to the
present problem. Daniels than asked if Minister Puig had a definite pro
posal either in the nature of a program or figures. Puig informed him that
he would prepare a study with concrete proposals to be delivered soon after
May 1st.
More than five months passed^ for it was not until October that the
Mexioan Foreign Office made a specific proposition for a lump-sum settle
ment. On October 12, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Qon-
aalea Roa, who was the Mexican authority on claims, returned to Mexico and
in person conferred with Daniels about the desirability of a lump-sum agree
ment exactly as they had done in Washington to March. After several
^Daniels to Hull, May 12, 1933, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1933 (Washington, 1952), V, 800-801. Hereafter cited
as Foreign Relationg~^ ™°"
2Xbid.
■a
-'Daniels, op. cit., p. 120.
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sessions together, Dr. Roa proposed a lump-sum settlement of $13,500,000.
This sum would amount to a recovery of 2.65 per cent for memorialized
claims (those that had been formally accepted by the claims commission) and
1.25 per cent for unmeiaorialissed ela3jas. The former figure was based on
the average recovery by six European nations for similar claims, and the
latter was the average recovery by the United States in its claims eonven-
tions with Mexico in 1839 and 1868.& tobassador Roa suggested payments ex
tending over a period of 30 years with no payment of interest during liquid
ation. In support of the time period, Roa pointed out ttiat the Internal
debt of Mexico was being liquidated in 1*0 years. He also referred to the
long-term payments of the Italian inter-governmental debt to the United
states and to the payment by Germany of awards of the German-American
claims commission.
.Ambassador Daniels favored acceptance of the Mexican proposal. In a
communication to Secretary of State CordeH Hull on November 1, Daniels in
dicated that he felt it was his duty to say that "if possible to reach any
fair agreement on a. fixed amount, our government should be ready to go more
than half the way."^ Daniels also pointed out that the record of past
claims conventions with Mexico showed that the United States had received
since I838 an average return of approximately two per cent. Daniels felt
that, unless an en bloc settlement was reached, the only alternative was a
return to the old claims commission. He knew that the continual hearing in
^'Daniels to Hull, November 1, 1933, Foreign Relationsa ¥, 806.
n
Cronon, op. eit., p. 78.
^Daniels to Acting Secretary of State William Phillips, November 17,
1933, Foreign Relations, ¥, 808-09.
^Daniels to Hull, November 1, 1933, Ibid., p. 808.
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the United States Congress, with charges and counter charges growing out of
the padded claims presented by both sides, Mthreatened to make friction and
deny the relation of brotherhood so much desired,1'1
The State Department did not fail to give careful and detailed con
sideration to the MeacLean proposal. Although it would have preferred to
settle the entire claims matter immediately, the State Department concluded
that the current proposal of the Mexican Government was unacceptable both
as regards amount and terms of payment.
Although it rejected on December 9ths the Mexican proposal for an en
bloe settlement of aU special and general claims, the United States pro
posed a General Claims Protocol for the evaluation of these claims, Daniels
^as instructed to bring about the acceptance of the American protoeol on
general claims while he was to suggest to the Mexican Government that it
draft a similar protocol for purposes of negotiating the special claims.
The State Department felt that if the Mexican Government -were itself to
sponsor one of the protocols that would create a greater feeling of mutual
ity in the matter.
Finally, on April 2k, 193k, after protracted negotiations, a Conven
tion on Special Claims (providing for a lump-sum settlement of special
claims against Mexico) and a General Claims Protocol were signed in Mexico
City by Daniels and Puig.^ Difficulties arose in getting the United State®
Congress to ratify the Special Claims Convention. "While the approval of it
2Phillips to Daniels, December 9, 1933, Ibid., p. 813.
3Phillips to Daniels, December 16, 1933, ibid., pp.
%ew York Times, April 25, 1931*, p. 16.
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was pending in the Senate, Jmbassador Daniels appeared before its Committee
on Foreign Affairs, explained in detail the significance of the Convention^
and answered interrogations of various members. In response to a request
by committee chairman Key Pittman, Daniels wrote him a letter on May 26,
1931+ in which he pointed out that all the claims in debate had originated
between 1910 and 1920—the tragic years folio-wing the overthrow of the Diaz
regime when Mexico lacked stable government. "Die amount of settlement,
2.65 per cent, was the same as that accepted by the European governments.
Daniels further stated that by "accepting this settlement we would go a long
way toward demonstrating our friendly and neighborly disposition and help
materially to further a solution to other important questions."1 Soon after
the Ambassador's plea for acceptance, the Senate ratified the Convention on
Special Claims on June 15, 193k. Ratifications of the Special Claims Con
vention were exchanged at Mexico City on December 13, 193lP while ratifica
tions of the General Claims Protocol were exchanged at Washington on Febru
ary 1, 1935 >
The General Claims Protocol provided that each government designate an
outstanding jurist to evaluate and classify the general claims which dated
back to Ju]y k, 1868. In the event of disagreement, the commissioners were
to call in an umpire.'' Additional problems derived from the general claims
^Daniels, op. pit., pp. 120-21.
2New York Times, June 16, 193U, p. 6.
^Convention on Special Claims, Pbreign Relations$ V, k67.
^Protocol on General Claims, ibid., p. 1*70.
^ York Times, April 25, 193k, p. 16.
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settlement plagued the two governments until 19Ul- The Special Claims
problem met with more immediate success in its solution. The convention
for settling this group of claims provided for an en bloc, settlement by
which the Mexican Government agreed to pay the United States $500,000 annu-
2
ally beginning on January 1, 1935 until the amount of $73,000,000 was paid.
For more than a quarter of a century^ there were attempts to secure
treaties that would be of mutual advantage to both the United States and
Mexico. But most of them failed until the adoption of the Good Neighbor
policy acoelerated agreement- Daniels referred to the settlement of the
claims issue as "the first fruit of that policy."
See below., Chapters III and IV.
2
Daniels, op. cit., p. 120.
^., pp. 123-214.
CHAPTER III
THE LAND EXPROPRIATION GONTRQTORSI
During the long dictatorship of Porfirio Dia^ (1877-1911), Mexican
resources cane largely under the control of a small group of Mexicans and
foreigners who became enormously rich. Df&z leased or sold irast portions
of Mexican agricultural and mineral lands to aliens in the hope of attract
ing foreign capital to build railroads in Mexico and modernise its agri
culture and industry.
As a result of the systematic exploitation of labor, beautiful estates
grew up, but the apparent prosperity was erected on a foundation of pwerty
2
and ignorance which no self-respecting country could endure indefinitely.
By the time d£&s was overthrown* rural Mexico was in effect the private pro
perty of a small number of immensely rich and powerful hacendados, propriet
ors of large estates who owned most of the countryside. Less than three per
eent of the Mexican people owned any land at all. Under such conditions, it
is not surprising that the Mexican peons eagerly rallied to the Resolution's
battle cry of "Land and Liberty.w^
Modern agrarian reform in Mexico began with Oarransa and rested in the
first instance on two legal foundations! namely, Oarran^a's decree of
, pp. Pit., pp. 32-33.
2¥illiam C. Townsend, Lazare Cardenas: Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor,
1952), p. 151*. ~ .
^Cronon, op. sit., p. 33.
2?
28
January 6, 1915 and Article 27 of the Constitution which went into effect
on February $} 1917. The decree of January 6, 1935 ordered the restitu
tion of communal lands to villages that had lost their holdings under the
Dfas regime. The decree also authorised the dotation, or granting, of
public and private lands to those villages lacking legal evidence to prove
the original village ownership. The essence of this decree was embodied in
Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, which called for a return to the
ejido system by asserting the basie right of the villages to whatever
"water, woods, and land" the members of the village in common might need.
Under Article 27, dotation of new land was recognised as equal in import
ance with restitution of previously held land. The Constitution, moreover,
specified that the new grants could be taken from any public or privately
owned lands in the vicinity of the petitioning village instead of only from
immediately adjoining lands as under the decree of 1915. This provision
greatly broadened the potential scope of the reform, program and vastly in
creased the amount of land available for distribution. Any village could
then petition the government for land on the ground of collective need. If
a petition asking restitution of previously held land failed for lack of
proof of village ownership the principle of dotation was to be automatical-
3y invoked.
The legal machinery for the restitution of land consisted of a Nation
al Agrarian Commission, State Agrarian CommissioniB for each state, and as
many local village committees as sight be necessary. Petitions for either
the restoration or dotation of ejidos were to be presented in the first
y N. Simpson, The Ejidos Mexico'a Way Out (Chapel Hill, 1937),
p. 56.
2Cronon, op. cit«, pp. 39-kO.
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instance directly to the governors of the states. Upon being approved by
the governor, after due investigation by the State Agrarian Commission, the
petitioning village would be given possession of the land through its local
committee. This possession, however, was considered to be provisional un
til such time as the ease was reviewed by the National Agrarian Commission-
final title being granted by the President of the Republic upon recommenda
tion of the National Commission.
In spite of the brave words of the 1915 decree and Article 27, the ac
tual distribution of land proved to be a slow process. Garran&a, who was
forced by the revolutionary ferment to pose as a champion of land reform,
actually had no real desire to implement the constitutional provisions.
Consequently, he distributed only about 180,000 hectares of land to 190
villages during the years 1915 to 1920. President Alvar© Obregon, who suc
ceeded to the presidency in 1920, moved with considerably greater vigor.
The Obregon administration distributed about 1,200^000 hectares of land dur-
ing his four-year term.&
Under President Plutarco E. Calles (1921^-28), the agrarian laws were
broadened in 1927 to include grants to any pjoblado, or populated place,
rather than merely to those villages possessing political rights. The Gal-
leg administration distributed more than 3*200,000 hectares of land, or ap
proximately two and a half times as much as had been distributed by the pre
ceding revolutionary governments.
Since, as late as 1923, foreigners held more than one-fifth of the
Simpson, op. sit., p. 58.
Cronon, op. cit., p. lj.0.
1., pp. i<.04jl.
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privately owned lands of Mexico, the Meseiean land-reform program was bound
to affeot alien interests. Of the total foreign holdings, Americans owned
16,558,000 hectares, or about $2 per centj Spaniards held about 6,233,000
hectares, or about 20 per centj and the British owned 5*313,000 hectares, or
17 per cent. By the end of 1927* "when the pace of land distribution slack
ened, nearly 700,000 hectares of foreign owned estates had been expropriat
ed for the agrarian program.^-
Ambassador Dwight ¥. Morrow, who was sent to Mexico in 1927 $ was able
to effect a compromise on agrarian and mineral legislation. Two months af
ter Morrow reached Mexico, the Mexican Congress authorized President Calles
to modify the agrarian laws. Although Calles had previously distributed
more land than any other Mexican President before Mm, not long after Mor-
2
row's arrival he was calling an end to further ©Jido grants.
The long era of inaction and retreat in the sphere of agrarian reform
ended with the inauguration of Lagaro Cardenas as President in 1931*. Presi
dent Cardenas believed that the agrarian problem had to be settled once and
for all if stability in Mexico were to be achieved. He believed it so
thoroughly that problems which seemed insurmountable to others did not stop
him. Cardenas personally supervised hundreds of transfers of land from
hacienda, or large estate, to ejido, or common land. During his six years
in office, he gave the villages almost U5j000,000 acres, twice as much as
had been transferred by 193U. When he left office, more than half of all
Mexicans were members of ejido communities with lands of their own embracing




Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, Ihe Reconquest of Mexico (New York, 1939),
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almost half of the crop land of the nation. For President Cardenas, the
breaking up of the large estates was the main point in the national program
for improving the living conditions of the peasants of Mexico. In a letter
to William G. Townsend, Cardenas stated? "The ideal of giving land to the
masses was written into the Constitution at the cost of much bloodshed and
2
my government is duty bound to comply with that mandate."
Clearly, however, the Mexican Government was in no position to buy
all the land it felt obliged to distribute. However, Mexico very early ac
knowledged an obligation to compensate land-owners for land taken under the
agrarian program. The big question was how. At the beginning, the revolu
tionary leaders thought that the villagers should pay for whatever land they
received. This idea was soon dropped as impractical and, in 1920, the Obre-
gon government recognised the central government's responsibility to pay for
the lands taken. Consequently, the government authorized the issuance of
long-term, interest-bearing agrarian bonds as compensation for land taken.
In practice, this was of little benefit to the affected landowners, for be
tween 1^20 and 1933S the bonds issued totaled less than 25 million pesos, and
indemnified only 170 persons whose claims covered only 223,000 hectares of
land. By 1933, the government had distributed approximately six million
hectares of land and thus incurred a potential agrarian debt of from a half-
billion to a billion pesos. Even before the advent of President Glrdenas, it
was abundantly clear that Mexico would never acknowledge the full debt nbr
pay more than a fraction of the real value of whatever part of the debt it
chose to recognize. By the time Ambassador Daniels arrived in Mexico, the
Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York, 1956), p. 380.
^Townsend, op. cit., p. 152.
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government had ceased to issue further agrarian bonds and had suspended
interest payments on the outstanding bonds.
From the start of the Mexican land-reform program, the United States
consistently held that, while Mexico had the right to expropriate private
property, no American-owned land should be taken unless prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation was made. The extremely vague character of the
Mexican agrarian laws and the fact that after 1932 Mexican courts ruled that
the agrarian program was not subject to judicial review made it difficult
for the United States to do more than issue ineffectual protests against
the injustice and illegalities of the program. Without going beyond the
bounds of polite diplomacy, Washington could only demand that Mexico pay im
mediate and effective compensation to American citizens affected by the Mex-
9
ican agrarian program.
Demands for compensation did little or nothing to save American lands
from expropriation, since under the agrarian laws the question of compensa
tion did not arise until after the transfer of ownership had actually taken
place. The landholder then had a year in which to file his claim with the
government. From his staff, Ambassador Daniels learned that the embassy in
the past had limited its efforts to seeing that Americans received the full
protection of existing Mexican laws.
Both the United States and Mexico desired to solve problems related
to the latter's expropriation practices. A General Claims Protocol, signed
on April 2k} 193h} provided that Mexico and the United States by discussion
-kjronon, op. cit., pp. 132-33.
2 PP. 133-13U.
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seek to solve the problem of agrarian claims growing out of the pre-192?
expropriations. Consequently, the State Department sent two claims experts,
Joseph R. Baker and Peter H. A. Flood, to Mexico City to engage in the in
formal discussion in April, 1935. In giving his instructions, Secretary of
State Hull pointed out to these experts that it was not the purpose of the
Department to agree to any settlement which would unduly sacrifice the in
terests of American claimants. He continued by stating that many American
claimants had already suffered the loss of substantial property rights with
out receiving that "just compensation to which they are entitled under the
applicable rules and principles of international law." The informal dis
cussions were carried on by Baker and Flood until August, 1935 when they
were recalled to Washington without having reached an agreement?" upon a
method of procedure by which the claims would be submitted to commissioners
for appraisal with the objective of looking to a lump-sum settlement.
Following the departure of Baker and Flood, negotiations were carried
on by Ambassador Daniels. In October, 1935, Daniels recommended the accept
ance of a draft protocol as proposed by the Mexican Foreign Office for the
adjustment of the so-called agrarian claims which had been filed with the
General Claims Commission. The State Departeent considered the proposed pro
tocol unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the United States because it was
particularly disturbed by statements contained in the aide-memoire, repre
senting the interpretation which the Mexican Government placed upon certain
provisions of the proposed protocol. This interpretation had as. its objective
xHull to Baker and Flood, April hs 193$, Foreign Relations, I?, 753-
^Daniels to the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sierra, January
21, 1936, ibid., V, 752.
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the prevention of any juridical discussion of the Mexican Constitution and
Mexican laws. The Department felt that if the United States should accept
the draft, subsequent proceedings would clearly reveal that this interpret
ation would be upheld by Mexican officials to the possible detriment of the
United States and its citizens who were claimants against Mexico on account
of lands expropriated from them by the Mexican authorities.
The State Department instructed Daniels that, unless the Mexican
Government receded from its position as disclosed by the draft under consid
eration and the accompanying aide-memoire, the United States would have no
alternative but to consider the negotiations at an end and to proceed with
the filing of memorials of the so-called agrarian claims with the General
Claims Commission leaving it to the Mexican Government to answer them or not
2
as it may see fit.
In a communication to the State Department on November 9, 1935*
Daniels expressed the belief that to end the negotiations at this time would
close the door to further negotiations. He pointed out that, from the Mexi
can point of view, the objeet of the proposed protocol in removing agrarian
claims from adjudication by the General Claims Commission was to avoid any
juridical discussion of the Mexican Constitution and laws, which had been
the object of Mexico from the ■vrery beginning of the discussions. The Mexican
negotiator never wavered in his demand that the claims should be decided up
on the facts in each case and that all legal discussion should be avoided.
It was the hope of the Mexican Government that, once a convention was signed^
an arrangement could be made for an en bloc settlement of these agrarian
to Daniels, November 2, 1935, Md., IV, 751*-55.
2Ibid., p. 757-
35
claims which were made before August 30, 192?. This would be in accord with
procedures followed in the special claims case.
Mien Ambassador Daniels went home for the Christmas holidays, he dis
cussed the proposed protocol at considerable length with officials of the
State Department. Upon his return to Mexico, he told the Mexican Govern
ment officials, in January, 1936, that the State Department had reached the
conclusion that if an agreement was not reached by February 1, 1936, the
American agent would have to proceed with the filing of memorials in the ag
rarian claims since the time within which these memorials could be filed un
der the protocol of 1931* was fast disappearing, fte Mexican official pointed
out that under the protocol the American agent had a perfect right to do so.
Daniels made it plain that the United States could not agree to waive the
right to insist that settlement must be made on the basis of "justice, equity,
and international law" and he proceeded to point out that the General
Claims Convention of 1923, Article 9, ratified by both Governments, recog
nised that the principles of international law, justice, and equity would
govern. Our Government, he said, felt that it could not agree that any set
tlement should be reached upon any other basis and that the treaty of 193lj.
2
had not changed that right.
No agreement was reached and Daniels received instructions from Secre
tary Hull to terminate, as of February 1, 1936, the informal discussion of
agrarian claims filed with the General Claims Commission covering expropri
ations prior to September, 1927 as provided for in the protocol of April 2kf
■^Daniels to Assistant Secretary of State Walton Moore, November 9,
^id-, PP. 757-59.
2Daniels to Hull, January 21, 1936, ibid., V, 750-52.
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193k*1
With the General Claims Commission keeping responsibility for agrari
an claims prior to September, 192?, Ambassador Daniels next concentrated on
securing a pledge from Mexican authorities not to take further American-
owned land until they had first paid for properties already expropriated.
As early as September, 1935, Daniels had urged that no more land be taken
from American citizens until adequate provision had been made to pay for
2
them. The State Department commended Daniels1 action in this respect and
instructed him to keep the matter actively before the Mexican Government un-
til a satisfactory outcome had been assured.
Mexico still sought a solution. The Acting Minister for Foreign Af
fairs, Mr. Cenieeros, reported in October, 1935 that President Cardenas was
very much concerned over the insistence of Ambassador Daniels' representa
tions that adequate compensation be paid for lands expropriated from Ameri
can citizens. The Acting Minister further pointed out that it was &mpossib3e
for the Mexican Government to give cash or bonds for lands expropriated
since all surplus in the Treasury had been earmarked for other purposes.
Moreover, the Government could not give out bonds in the enormous amount
that would be necessary to reimburse all persons for lands that had been,
and might be in the future, expropriated from them. If compensation were
given to American citizens, the Mexican Government would be obliged to pay
all other foreigners and Mexican citizens as well.
^Daniels to Hull, February 6, 1936, ibid., p. 757.
2Daniels to Hull, September 19, 1935, ibid., IV, 776.
%ull to Daniels, September 28, 1935, ikid.* p. 778.
^Daniels to Hull, October 10, 1935, ibid., pp. 778-79-
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Earlier in the month, Genieeros had suggested that the Mexican Govern
ment might be disposed to refrain from further seizure of American-owned
lands without prompt payment of adequate compensation. The State Department
shared Daniels1 opinion that a eommitjaent of this nature, even if infonnaHy
and confidentially given3 would contribute to the mitigation of a continuous
cause of friction between the countries. The State Department felt that the
suggestion would involve no recognition of rights of United States citizens
in excess of those guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 2? of the
Constitution of Mexico which stipulates that "private property shall not be
expropriated except for reason of public utility and subject to payment of
indemnity."^ Hull stated to Daniels that
it is understood, of course, that the proposed exemption of American
citizens from future expropriation eould not be conditioned upon any
undertaking on the part of the United States Government to acquiesce,
either tacitly or otherwise, in the failure of the Mexican Government
to compensate those American citizens whose lands have already been
taken.*
In November, Genieeros asked that the American Government refrain from press
ing the matter further until after the new year opened because he strongly-
believed that by that time President Cardenas would be ready to make a pro
's
posal which he believed would be satisfactory to the American Government.
The United States patiently awaited the Mexican proposal and refrained
from pressing a solution to the matter in the expectation that a satisfactory
solution would be made by the Mexican Government. However, as late as
April 16, 1936, no proposal had been advanced by the Mexican Government. Ihe
to Daniels, October 23, 1935, ibid., p. 780.
^Daniels to Hull, November 22, 1935, ibid., p. 782.
2Md.
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United States did not consider that it would be justified in longer with
holding representation in the matter. Therefore, the State Department in
structed Daniels to inform the Mexican Government that, in accordance with
its promise, it hoped to soon receive proposals providing for (1) the in
demnification of American citizens for land already expropriated, and
(2) positive assurance that no more land would be taken from American citi
zens without the payment of prompt and adequate compensation.
More than four months passed and the Mexican Government still failed
to respond to the United States representations of April, 1936. Daniels,
therefore, was instructed again to bring the matter urgently to the atten-
2
tion of the appropriate Mexican authorities. Daniels made formal representa
tion again in September, 1936. He pointed out in a memorandum to the Mexican
Foreign Office that the promised proposal had not been received and that in
the meantime, contrary to the Mexican Constitution, properties of American
citizens continued to be expropriated without compensation. The United
States, Daniels stated, viewed with deep concern such expropriation without
compensation,3 In a conversation with Mexican officials in October at the
Foreign Office, Francisco Castillo Najera, Mexican Ambassador to the United
States, told Daniels that President Cardenas would make the budget for ag
rarian property just as large as possible at the first of the year. Daniels
inquired whether it would be in money or bonds and was informed by the Under
secretary of Foreign Affairs, Beteta, that the fund was to be mainly in bonds
■^Daniels to the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hay, April 16,
1936, ibid., V, 693-9U.
2More to Daniels, August 8, 1936, ibid.* p. 69h-
^Daniels to Hull, September 17, 1936, ibid., p. 69$.
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and with some cash.
In December, President Cardenas stated to Daniels that it was his in
tention to have the budget for the next year provide for the resumption of
the issuance of agrarian bonds. Hie President stated that he planned to
resume the issuance of these bonds even if it were only for a small amount
each year. He continued by saying that he realized that the amount of com
pensation which landowners would actually receive each year would be con
sidered inadequate but that "the magnitude of the agrarian debt, amounting
to many millions or more, precluded any other system."^
Another year passed without a satisfactory proposal being presented
by the Mexican Government. In a conversation held in December, 1937 * be
tween United States and Mexican officials in Washington, the Mexican Minis
ter of Finance, Eduardo Snares, stated that he was giving study to the pos
sibility of the issuance of agrarian bonds. The possibility was complicat
ed by the fact that the Mexican Government did not wish to give bonds to the
nationals of one country and not give them to the nationals of aU the
others, as well as to the Mexican citizens. During the course of the dis
cussion, it was brought out that the interest of the United States was in
quick compensation for its citizens rather than in delaying tactics or ex-
euses ."*■
The United States Department of State decided early in 1938 to press
for a solution to the claims issue. In response to inquiries at his press
Daniels to Hull, October 20, 1936, ibid., pp. 707-08.
Memorandum by Pierre Boal, Counselor for the Embassy, December 15,
3 ibid,, p. 7H.
Memorandum of Conversation by Laurence Duggan, Chief of the Division
of the American Republics, December Ik, 1937, ibid., V, 6kl.
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conference in the latter part of March, 1938* Secretary Hull pointed out that
during the past few years, in pursuance of its national policy, the Mexican
Government had expropriated and was continuing to expropriate properties of
American citizens. He made it plain that the United States did not question
the right of the Government of Mexico to expropriate properties within its
jurisdiction and he emphasized the fact that the United States had on numer
ous occasions and in a friendly manner pointed out to Mexico that
in accordance with every principle of international law, of comity be
tween nations and of equity, the properties of its nationals so expro
priated are required to be paid for by compensation representing fair,
assured and effective value to the nationals from whom these proper
ties were taken.^
In the summer of 1938, the State Department again stepped up its pressure
regarding the agrarian claims. It listed some $10s000,000 of outstanding
unpaid American claims against Mexico since 1927 arising from the expro-
priation of American owned lands.
In the meantime, President CaVdenas and his advisers recognised that
the famous oil expropriation of March 18, 1938 made it necessary to pay more
attention to United States requests for an agrarian settlement, if Mexico's
offer to compensate the oil companies were to carry conviction. With this
in mind, a few weeks after the oil expropriation, Cardenas offered to begin
making monthly payments on the agrarian debt, giving special priority to
Americans with hardship cases. As a beginning, Cardenas promised to set a-
side 120,000 pesos monthly as a continuing compensation for the expropria
tions of agrarian properties belonging to American citizens. Cardenas made
it clear that this monthly segregation of 120,,000 pesos was intended solely
Statement by HuH, March 30, 1938, ibid., V, 662.
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to pro-ride compensation for the imeriean owners of agrarian properties in
the Yaqui Valleys which he computed as totaling 1*,000,000 pesos. In dis
cussing this, the Mexican Ambassador, Hsfoera, pointed out to Undersecretary
of States Welles that President Cardenas was still studying ways to pay for
the other expropriated agrarian properties and said that all the small
American landowners whose lands had been expropriated would be paid in cash
before the end of the Mexican President's term. The President intended to
compensate the large landowners in agrarian bonds.
Undersecretary of State Welles informed Ambassador Najera that he was
glad to have this partially encouraging information. However, he desired
to register the emphatic opinion that, insofar as its nationals were con
cerned, this government could not agree to the drawing of any distinction
between one group of Americans whose properties had been expropriated in
Mexico and another group solely because one group happened to am larger
tracts than the other. Najera said that he fully understood the legitim
acy of this position but he felt that President Cardenas wished it made
clear that his Government appreciated the urgent need of some of the Ameri
can individuals whose land had been seized.
The State Department, however, had a rather different view of the
proper agrarian settlement. Consequently, on June 29, 1938, Welles proposed
a settlement of the agrarian claims. His proposal was concerned solely with
claims arising out of the expropriations made since August 30, 1927. With
respect to these claims, the United States intended to make a settlement in
accordance with the provisions of the General Claims Convention of 193li.
^Memorandum of Conversation by Welles, May 9, 1938, Foreign Relations,
v, 750-51.
2Ibid.
Welles' June plan proposed that the Mexican Government set aside monthly
for the next thirty months the approximate sum of $337,000 for the exclu
sive purpose of making compensation for expropriated American property.
Welles calculated these claims to be more than flO^OOOjOOO.1 Welles1 pro
posal was rejected by Mexico. Foreign Minister Hay considered the proposal
to establish a previous deposit as a guarantee of payment for the expropri
ated lands incompatible with the good faith and mutual confidence which
should prevail among nations.
Following the Mexican rejection of Welles' plan, Hull handed Mexican
Ambassador Najera a note on July 21 protesting Mexico's long record of
seizing American owned lands without making prompt payment of just compen
sation. Hull stated that "the taking of property without compensation is not
expropriation. It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there
may be an expressed intent to pay at some time in the future." In an effort
to bring the agrarian controversy to an end, Hull, in the same note, asked
Mexico to agree to arbitrate the question of whether she had complied with
international law in compensating American landowners, and if she had not, to
let the arbitral commission set the amount and terms under which such compen
sation should be made.3
Foreign Minister Hay rejected Hull's proposal to arbitrate on Aug
ust 3rd. Hay pointed out that Mexico considered that arbitration should be
reserved for cases of irreducible differences in which either the juridical
belles to Najera, June 29, 1938, ibid. 3 pp. 669-72.
2
Hay to Daniels, September 1, 1938, S. Shepard Jones and DenysP. Myers
(eds.), Documents on American Foreign Relations (Boston, 1939), I, H5.
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Hull to Najera, July 21, 1938, ibid., pp. 90-92.
principle under discussion or the acts giving origin to the arbitration are
of such character that the two people at variance do not find any more ob
vious way of coining to such an agreement. He declared that such was not the
case because Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution ordained payment for
properties which the state expropriates on grounds of public utility, there
fore, the Mexican Government has neYer denied such obligation. Consequently
Hay felt that there was no subject matter for the proposed arbitration.
In the same communication in which Hay rejected Hull's arbitration pro
posals he suggested that the two countries appoint one representatiTe each
for the purpose of evaluating American agrarian properties which had been ex
propriated and determini.ng the manner or payment. Hay stated that he believ
ed in this way the request of American citizens for payment for lands which
2
had been taken from them subsequent to August 30, 1927 could be satisfied.
Several weeks passed before agreement was reached on Hay's suggestion.
On August 22nd, Hull called upon Mexico to settle the agrarian dispute
through either regular arbitration or a mixed claims commission headed by an
impartial arbitrator. Meanwhile no more American lands should be taken with
out arrangements for adequate, prompt, and effective compensation. Mexico
agreed to submit the agrarian claims to a two-man commission subject to the
ruling of a third impartial arbitrator on September 1. With regard to the
future agrarian expropriation, the Foreign Minister stated that while the
Government of Mexico was unable to prevent the application of the agrarian
law, it would limit itself in each case to submitting to the consideration
XHay to Daniels, August 3, 1938, ibid., p. 97.
2Ibid., pp. 97-98.
to Najera, August 22, 1938, ibid., pp. 109-10.
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of the proposed commission the amount and terms of payment.
On September 20, Hull suggested to Najera that the two governments
"begin quiet oral conversations on the practical details of a settlement
based on a mixed claims commission. Over the next few weeks the two govern
ments discussed the details of a settlement. A snag soon developed over the
question of how much Mexico should pay for the agrarian claims each year.
The State Department felt that the first Mexican offer of $500,000 was in
adequate. Daniels conceded that the sum was not as much as desired, but he
suggested that it would be wiser to agree to some figure that Mexico could
afford to pay regularly than to insist upon larger promises which might not
2
be met.
In the negotiations that followed, the State Department was determined
to raise the payments as high as possible. Undersecretary of State Welles
proposed to Ambassador Najera that Mexico pay $1,000,000 on agrarian claims
in 1939 and the balance in four annual installments. Since the total debt
would not be determined until after the claims commission had completed its
work, this was asking the Mexican. Government to sign a blank check. As soon
as he learned of Welles proposal, President Cardenas called Daniels to the
National Palace and protested that he could not get his Congress to approve
an agreement committing the eountay to a series of undetermined payments.
The President offered instead to pay $1,000,000 a year until the American
agrarian claims were liquidated. Daniels promptly telephoned this welcome
news to Washington.
HHay to Daniels, September 1, 1938, ibid.* p. 115.
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Cronon, op. cit., pp. 226*27
3Ibid., pp. 227-28.
A few days later, the State Department informed Najera that the
United States would accept Cardenas' offer, provided Mexico pay the first
$1,000,000 within six months after the claims commission began its work.
The two governments could agree upon subsequent payments after the com
mission had determined the value of the claims. However, they were required
to be at least $1,000,000 a year. Hull formally outlined the settlement
in a public note in which he stated
my Government has a particular desire to safeguard friendship with
Mexico not only because Mexico is one of its nearest neighbors but
on account of the many ways in which ever improving relations, in
the fullest sense, between the two countries could be complementary
and mutually beneficial. It has, therefore, spared no effort to
arrive at prompt, friendly and satisfactory solutions of problems
as they arose*2
Mexico promptly confirmed its approval of the settlement but with the fol
lowing reservations
The Government of Mexico deems it necessary to have it understood
that the decision reached by the representatives designated, shall in
lib ■casecextend beyond evaluation of the land expropriated and the mo
dalities of payment of the amount determined; that they shall not con
stitute a precedent, in any case nor for any reason.-*
Daniels at no time during the agrarian controversy approved of the
State Department's stern approach. He was aware that such a course could
imperil the Good Neighbor policy and embitter United States relations with
the rest of Latin America. He reminded President Roosevelt that
patience is the virtue essential in a Good Neighbor Policy. The deli
cate situation here is putting that doctrine to a severe test, It is
more important that it be maintained than that any particular debt
collection be pressed.h
2Hull to Najera, November 9$ 1938, Documents, I, 116.
%ay to Daniels, November 12, 1938, ibid., p. 120.
^Daniels to Roosevelt, July 2, 1938, Roosevelt Papers, quoted in
Cronon, op. cit., p. 216. "~" ~"~
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Though the agrarian controversy put the Good Neighbor policy to a
severe test, it was mild in comparison to the one brought on by the expro
priation of American oil properties in Mexico.
CHAPTER I?
THE OIL EXPROPRIATION CONTROVERSY
The background of the oil expropriation eontroirersy in United States-
Mexican relations goes back to the adoption of the new Mexican Constitution
in 1917. Article 27 of the Constitution enunciated the doctrine that "in
the nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances...pet
roleum and all hydrocarbons—solid, liquid or gaseous.8'1 According to the
doctrine a grant of oil land, or its purchase, did not entitle the owier to
more than the right to use the surface. In order to dig minerals or ex
tract oil, permission from the Mexican nation was necessary. Most of the
oil, mineral, and agricultural holdings of Americans had been obtained be
tween 1876 and 1917. Th® Americans became increasingly concerned about tiie
application of this new doctrine.2
In 1917, President Yenustiano Carranaa of Mexico assured the United
States Ambassador, Henry P. Fletcher, that existing American properties
would not be subject to action under Article 27 of the new Mexican Constitu
tion. Carranza did not keep his promise. He demanded that Americans apply
for drilling permits and began to tax them. The companies ignored the re
quests and orders to obtain permits. Under Anglo-American and international
lMMexican Constitution of 1917,M Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917 (Washington,
2
Cllne* QP« cit., p. 205.
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law, the companies owned the land which they had bought and its subsoil
properties as well—'although the Mexican law said they did not. For the
time being the government did not enforce it.
After Garranga"s downfall in 1920s Alvaro Obregon was constitutional-
2
ly elected president by popular suffrage in September* 1920. Woodrow Wil
son's administration refrained from recognizing the new Obregon Government
in the absence of a specific understanding about the protection of American
nationals and property under the new Mexican Constitution. The Republican
administrations of Harding and Coolidge followed the same policy. President
Obrego'n gave his personal assurances for the security of American life and
property in Mexico and for the ownership of land acquired by Americans prior
to the adoption of the new Constitution on May 1, 1917, ft&t these promises
bound only Obregon and his existing government. Secretary of State Charles
E. Hughes insisted that recognition must be contingent upon a treaty which
would explicitly bind the Mexican nation itself to adequate guarantees.
This Obregon refused.^
In an effort to ease the tension, Obregon arranged for the Mexican
Supreme Court, which was sitting on a number of oil cases, to enunciate the
doctrine of the "positive acts" in 1921. The Court handed down a judgment
in favor of the Texas Oil Company on September 26th when it declared that if
owners of oil lands had actually erected drilling equipment or otherwise had
performed some "positive acts" before the Constitution of 1917 had gone into
effect, their holdings were secure. Such lands were exempted from the
13Md.
2Bemis, The Latin American Policy, p.
•%emis, A Short History, pp. 335-36.
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requirement of getting government permits to drill. For all intents and
purposes, the companies owned both the land and its oil.
Despite the decision of the court, Hughes still wanted a firm commit
ment in treaty form which would be binding on all future Mexican Governments.
Obregon would not agree to a treaty but suggested that the countries talk
over the matters at issue. Secretary Hughes accepted tiie suggestion and
two commissions from each each nation were named to discuss jointly the
whole matter of foreign holdings and to report their findings to their res-
2
pective governments.
The meetings of the commissioners, from May to August, 1923, became
known as the Bucareli Conference. The American representatives accepted the
position of the Mexican Government that it had an unquestioned right to re
gulate the oil industry according to the new reforms providing these reforms
did not apply to property acquired under other conditions before the Con
stitution of 1917 went into effect. The American representatives denied the
necessity of a company's having to perform before May 1, 1917 a "positive
act" of exploitation in order to validate continuing title to petroleum
lands acquired before that date. They held such necessity to be ex post
facto. The Mexican representatives clung steadfastly to the necessity of
such an act before 1917s but they set forth a definition which was so phras
ed that the slightest trace of action would suffice for the "positive act."
This new statement seemed to mean that on and under lands on which such an
act had been performed the subsoil products were excluded from the national
ization program of Article 27. On the basis of the agreements reaehed in
ine, op. cit.j p. 206.
2Ibid.
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the Bueareli Conferences, the United States formally recognised the Govern-
ment of Mexico de jure under the presidency of Obregon on August 31, 1923.
Plutareo E. Calles, who succeeded Obregon to the presidency of Mexico
in 192li, favored a retroactive interpretation of the Constitution of 1917.
In 192$, the Mexican Congress enacted perraanent legislation for the appli
cation of certain petroleum reforms derived from the Constitution of 1917,
hitherto embodied in temporary decrees. The United States saw in this new
2
legislation a violation of the Bucareli agreements, for it would have
forced the owners of oil properties in Mexico to change their absolute land
titles into fifty-year leases.
Because of this new legislation, relations with Mexico had become al
most hopelessly embroiled when President Calvin Coolidge appointed Dwight
Morrow as United States Ambassador to Mexico in September, 1927.^ Morrow
discussed the subject of American petroleum rights under the 1917 Constitu
tion and subsequent regulatory legislation with President Calles in a pri
vate conference on November 8, 1927. During the period in which the con
ference was held there were cases in the Mexican Court which challenged the
constitutionality of the 1925 law. Die ambassador indicated to the Mesdcan
President that a decision in one of the cases reaffirming the doctrine of
the Texas case would go far toward solving the controversy. Aided by the
favorable decision which he had suggested, Morrow finally worked out a
T3emis, A Diplomatic History, p. 558.
2Ibid., p. 560.
^Bailey, Qj^jgit., p. 713.
^Stanley R. Ross, "Dwight
American Histoilcaljtoyieg, XXXVIII (November, 1958), 5ll»
Morrow and the Mexican Revolution," Hispanic
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compromise by which American oil rights secured prior to the Constitution
of 1917 could be retained.1
The oil settlement effected by Morrow lasted until 1938 when Laaaro
Cardenas expropriated foreign oil properties in Mexico. When Cardenas
cam© to the Mexican presidency in 193k > he catered to the mall farmer and
the working man and plaoed new emphasis upon the slogan "Mexico for the
Mexicans,11 In his attitude to American land and oil interests, he may have
drawn courage from the United States' acceptance of the nonintervention
principle at Montevideo and Buenos Aires.
President Cardenas1 expropriation decree was the climax of a labor
dispute involving seventeen companies. On November 3* 1936, the National
Syndicate, a newly formed labor organisation, presented demands for a com
prehensive labor agreement.^ The union declared that it should conform to
the labor code of 1931 which was based on stipulations found in Article 123
of the Mexican Constitution. The companies were called upon to raise wages
and to provide a atBdb"ea?:/of what are now termed fringe benefits. These
fringe benefits included an eight-hour-work day, double pay for overtime,
strike pay, adequate and sanitary housing, schools for workers and their
children, and paid vacations. The union wanted a closed shop and the en
forced inclusion of white-colter office forces within union ranks.^ In No
vember, almost simultaneous with the presentation of these labor demands,
bailey, op. cit., p. 713.
2Cline, op. cit., p. 212.
nPratt, op. oit.9 p. 619«.
^Arthur ¥. Macmahon, "The Mexican Oil Industry Since Expropriation,w
Political Science Quarterly, L¥II (March, 19^2), 32.
, op.cit., p. 232.
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the Mexican Congress passed a new Expropriation Law. This act revised the
President's power to issue expropriating decrees pursuant to the Oonstitui
tion of 1917 and this legislation broadened the grounds of "public utility"
on which property might be taken.
English and American companies formed a common front to bargain with
labor. Ihey were willing to bargain collectively, g"rant an industry-wide
contract, and dicker about fringe benefits. The companies, however, ob
jected to the proposed wage increases which they termed excessive and they
were adamant against union insistence on including white-collar office
forces under the control of the Petroleum Syndicate. To them this was an
2
unwarranted infringement on the right of management.
Joint conferences failing, a strike was called on May 27, 1937. The
public did not respond very sympathetically. Waen the strike seemed about
to fail, the union on June 9th claimed that their walk out was not a strike
but an "economic conflict." An "economic conflict11 is a more generalized
situation in which the basic elements of an industry have become unbalanced
to the point where normal strikes have no power. If the Federal government
recognized the plea that a worker-employee struggle was an "economic con
flict," it must (1) arbitrate, (2) conciliate the faction, (3) make an
award that would equalize the economic power between employers and workers,
and (li) make both sides conform to the award and the labor laws. Arbitra
tion was mandatory in an "economic conflict." Once the erstwhile strike of
the union was declared an "economic conflict," the matter passed into legal,
n» op« cit,, p. 32.
2Gline, op. eit.» pp. 232-33.
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official, federal channels. The companies at that point faced Cardenas, the
President of Mexico, not the union.
The Federal Board of Arbitration and Conciliation was the federal or
gan charged with settling the "economic conflict." The Federal Board creat
ed its own investigating commission to determine the facts about the Mexican
oil industry and, on the basis of their findings, decided to make recommend
ations for final awards. The commission made an exhaustive survey and rend-
2
ered its report on August 3, 1937. After studying the matter for a short
time, the Federal Board made its definitive award on August 18, 1937. It
ordered the companies to sign the collective contract and raise wages by
27 per cent, calculated at 26,329,393 pesos. Further, the companies were
directed to allow their office help to join the Petroleum Syndicate. The
Board commanded the employers to provide a I^O-hour, 5-day work week, pen
sions, vacations, life insurance, and housing or housing allowances.
Although the August 18th award of the Federal Board was an order from
the authorized Mexican labor tribunal, the companies ignored it. On Decem
ber 28, 1937, the oil companies instituted suit in the Mexican Supreme Court
and demanded injunctive remedy. Under Mexican law the Supreme Court could
issue an order suspending the action of administrative agencies until the
constitutionality of their action was decided. The application of the com
panies claimed that they were unable to pay the sum awarded.
op. cit., pp. 233-3U.
gIbid., p. 23U.
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On Mareh 1, 1938, the highest tribunal in the land rejected the ap
peal and ratified the findings, of the Board. The Board then set a dead
line of March 7th for complianee with their August 18th award. Hie compan
ies then began to bargain with the Board and workers, Ihey offered to
raise wages by 21*,000,000 pesos. Speaking in behalf of the workers, Presi
dent Cardenas said the companies' terms were acceptable.2 The companies
made an inexcusable blunder by demanding that Cardenas put his acceptance in
writing. Unaccustomed to having his word questioned, the President consid
ered the request a slur on his personal honor and a grave reflection on the
integrity of his administration."*
While the bargaining between the companies, the Syndicate, and the
President had been going on, the Federal Board extended the deadline for
compliance by a week. On March 15th, the deadline for compliance, the com
panies bluntly notified the Board that they could not and would not comp^
Hearing of the companies' flat refusal to obey, the dhief executive
decided to'expropriate the whole industry. The defiance of the petroleum
producers—coming in the wake of their veiled insults to him and his govern
ment—pushed the president into this irreversible decision. He could not
back down and retain the respect of his countrymen. Consequently, Cardenas
issued the expropriation decree on March 18, 1938.^ On the morning of March













extent necessary in the judgment of the Minister of National Economy for
the discovery, production, conveyance, storage, and distribution of the
petroleum industry. The decrees stated that the Minister of Finance would
pay indemnity in accordance ■with the provisions of Article 27 of the Con
stitution and Articles 10 and 20 of the Law of Expropriation. The indemnity
was to be paid in cash within a period not to exceed ten years. Expropri-
1
ation was declared to be effective immediately.
In a conversation with Francisco Castillo Najera, Mexican Ambassador
to Washington, on March 21st, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles suggest
ed that President Cardenas should rescind the expropriation decree. Na'jera
doubted that it was possible for the President to take such action since a
great deal of public agitation had been aroused in support of the action of
the President. He, nevertheless, emphasized his determination to do every-
o
thing possible to bring about such solution.
In Mexico, American Ambassador Josephus Daniels called upon President
Cardenas on March 22nd. During this visit, Daniels stressed the surprise and
concern of Secretary Hull over the actions which the President had taken in
respect to American petroleum interests in Mexico. Cardenas expressed his
appreciation for the friendly attitude of the republic to the north and men
tioned his concern over the possible effect of the oil controversy on the
country's friendship with democratic nations. The Mexican President indicat
ed his government's intention to offer compensation through allotments to the
companies of a share in oil production which share would ultimately be cred
ited in the final settlement. At the same time, a discussion of the value
Daniels to Hull, March 19, 1938, Foreign Relations, V, 725-26.
Memorandum of Conversation by Welles, March 21, 1938, ibid., p. 733.
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of the expropriated properties could take place concurrently.
Despite the conciliatory attitude of President Cardenas, the State
Department ultimately persuaded the Treasury Department to boycott Mexican
silver. Because of a financial crisis in Mexico, Henry Morgenthau, Secre
tary of the Treasury, had entered into an agreement with Mexico on December
29, 1937 to purchase 35,000,000 ounces of Mexican silver and to continue the
regular monthly purchases. The Treasury agreement came after conferences in
Washington which had begun in mid-December. A delay was caused by a col
lision of the State Department's negotiations on the oil and land issues
with the Treasury Department's conversations on silver and the immediate
support of a struggling neighbor. By December, 1937, the emphasis of the
State Department was on a general settlement of the whole Mexican situation
in which concessions should be made first by the Mexicans before financial
aid was extended to them. At first Morgenthau was inclined to agree with
2
the State Department.
Morgenthau, on reflection, decided that the democratic regime in Mexi
co needed help. He urged President Roosevelt to persuade the State Depart
ment to let the Treasury Department proceed independently. He told the
President on December 15, 1937s
We're going to wake up and find inside a year that Italy, Germany, and
Japan have taken over Mexico... It's the richest—the greatest store of
natural resources close to the ocean of any country in the world ....
They've got everything that those three countries need.3
But as the days passed, President Roosevelt reported to Morgenthau no change
Daniels to Hull, March 22, 1938, ibid., pp. 733-3U.
2Allen Seymour Everest, Morgenthau; The Mew Deal and Silver (New
York, 1950), pp. &V87.
John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries (Boston, 1959), p.
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of policy. Pressed by Morgenthau, Welles consented to help the Mexicans
in their financial crisis and the agreement of December 29, 1937 was made.
On March 2ks 1938, Herbert Feis, the State Department's economic ad
viser, told Morgenthau that the State Department was embarrassed because
the Treasury Department was continuing to subsidize the Mexicans by buying
their silver every month. Morgenthau stated that from the monetary stand
point he thought that the United States ought to continue to buy Mexican
silver. Reluctantly, he agreed to the request of the State Department to
boycott Mexican silver although he insisted on a formal request. On
March 25, 1938, Feis delivered a statement of policy which constituted a
formal request. It read;
In view of the decision of the Government of the United States to re-
examine certain of its financial and commercial relationships with
Mexico, the Treasury will defer continuation of the months silver pur
chase arrangements with Mexico until further notice.^
The silver boycott was only one phase of the State Department's offen
sive against Mexico following expropriation of American oil properties. On
Saturday, March 26, 1938, Hull cabled Daniels the text of a long protest
note which was to be delivered not later than noon on the following Monday
to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Hay. Daniels thought
that the language of the note was unduly sharp. It read, in part, as fol
lows:
my Government directs me to inquire, in the event that the Mexican
Government persist in this expropriation, without my Government
undertaking to speak for the American interests involved, but solely
for its preliminary information, what specific action with respect
to payment for the properties in question is contemplated by the Mex




made, and when such payment may be expected. In as much as the Amer
ican citizens involved have already been deprived of their properties
... my Government considers itself entitled to ask for a prompt
reply to this inquiry.!
On the same day, Daniels received instruction from Hull to return to
Washington for the purpose of consultation immediately after presenting the
protest note to Foreign Minister Hay. The outlines of the strategy of the
State Department vease clear: A stiff diplomatic protest, followed by a sil
ver boycott and the withdrawal of the American Ambassador. If these moves
did not cause Cardenas to return the oil properties, they would at least be
a warning to other Latin American Governments.
Daniels presented the American protest note to Foreign Minister Hay at
the Foreign Office on Sunday afternoon, March 27, 1938. While Daniels was
in full accord with Secretary Hull's insistence upon payment for properties
expropriated, he did not believe that a resort to note-writing would achieve
the results sought, particularly since both Hay and President Cardenas had
given their word orally to do what Hull asked in his note. Seeing that the
two countries might be in for a long and inconclusive period of note writing,
Daniels said to the Foreign Minister: "Since the President has promised
payment for property expropriated, it may be as well to consider the note
as 'not received' and I will convey again to my government the promise to
pay.11^ When Daniels reported his conversation with the Foreign Minister to
Hull, he aaid that his note would, therefore, not be given to the press.
Furthermore, he agreed not to make public the note at that time and not at
^-Daniels, op. cit., p. 23U.
2Hull to Daniels, March 26, 1938, Foreign Relations, Vs 733.
-xronon, op. cit., p. 193•
^Daniels, op. cit., p. 23$.
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all if satisfactory arrangements were made.
In July,, President Cardenas told a reporter for the New York Times
that the United States had not presented any formal notes or demands, only
informal questions concerning the oil expropriation. When Hull learned of
thiss he instructed Daniels to inform the Department as soon as possible
whether he had obtained or could obtain confirmation of the report. In a
later communication* Hull directed Daniels to inform the Minister for
Foreign Affairs that
this Government has always considered, and will continue to consider
the note (#f March 27J as regularly delivered and valid in e^ery re-
speet. You may inform General Hay that in view of a misunderstanding
that has arisen an endeavor will be ma de, in responding to press in
quiry, not to mention this particular communication but that my posi
tion in this matter will have to be reconsidered if the Mexican Gov
ernment or persons close^ connected therewith continue to deny pub
licly that a note was delivered on March 27.3
Relative to the protest note of March 27, Daniels successfully sabotaged the
State Department's plan for a stern public rebuke of Mexico. His action in
the matter was clearly insubordinate. let, in Daniels defense, it should be
noted that he was convinced that the Department was not sufficiently aware
that its course would very likely lead to an open break with Mexico and the ;.
United States—a break that might destroy five years of good neighbor diplo
macy. No one can tell what might have been the result if Daniels had not
blunted the force of the State Department's protest. Ramon Beteta, Mexico's
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs* believed that Daniels almost single
handedly prevented a break between th© United States and Mexico at that
Ibid.,, p. 237.
2Hull to Daniels, July 20, 1938, Foreign Relations, V, 755-56.
3Hull to Daniels, July 21, 1938, ibid., p. 757.
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time. He suggested that both countries owe a heavy debt to the Imbassador's
idlHngness to jeopardise his career in the futherance of the Good Neighbor
policy.
Despite the silver boycott and protest note of March 2?th, the United
States admitted from the beginning Mexico's right to expropriate the Ameri
can oil properties provided immediate and adequate compensation was made.
This position was made clear in a press statement by Secretary of State HuH:
This Government has not undertaken and does not undertake to
question the right of the Government of Mexico in the exercise of its
sovereign power to expropriate properties within its jurisdiction.
This Government has, however, on numerous occasions and it the most
friendly manner pointed out to the Government of Mexico that in accord
ance with every principle of international law, of comity between
nations and of equity, the properties of its nationals so expropriated
are required to be paid for by compensation representing Jair, assured
and effective value to the nationals from whom these properties were
taken.
On March 31at, Daniels received a letter from President Cardenas in
which he expressed his governments appreciation for the understanding at
titude adopted by the United States in the oil crisis?
Today my country is happy to celebrate, without reservations, the
proof of friendship which it has received from yours and which will be
carried in the hearts of its people.
Mexico has always wished to maintain its prestige, carrying out its
obligations, but elements which did not understand Mexico placed ob
stacles in the way of this high and noble purpose. Today a new dawn
breaks on its future with the opening to it of doors of opportunity.
You may be sure, Mr. Ambassador, that Mexico will know how to honor its
obligations of today and its obligations of yesterday.3
On receiving Cardenas' letter, Hull pointed out that he was "gratified
by the expressions of friendship, esteem, and confidence on the part of the
"TJronon, op. eit., p. 198.
Statement for the Press by Hull, March 30, 1938, Foreign Relations.
V, 662. ~
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Mexican Government and people. . . ." As for Mexico's determination to
honor its obligations, Hull stated his sincere belief that "under these,
conditions a rapid, satisfactorys and equitable solution of the pending
problems between the two countries can be found."
During the hectic days immediately following Mexico's seizure of Amer
ican oil properties, President Roosevelt was vacationing at Warm Springs,
Georgia, where he was content to remain aloof from the policy argument® go
ing on in Washington. In a press conference with a New York Times reporter
on April 1st, he was asked to comment on the situation created by the ex
propriation of American owned properties in Mexico. The President stated
that Mthe discussions between the two governments on the matter seened to be
coining along satisfactorily/1 and he indicated that the oil interests must
limit their elaims to the amount of their actual investments, less depreci-
2
ation, because claims based on prospective profits would not be supported*
Following the Presidential interview, the Mexican Congress wrote a
letter of thanks to him stating that
world democracy has found in our President Cardenas and yourself its
two most vigorous representatives. Those comprising this chamber set
a historic precedent in clasping your hand, and, in the name of the
people of our own country, that of the American people, which now joins
the rest of the continent in interpreting laws which will achieve hap
piness for all peoples by the deepest sentiment of social justice.
Upon receiving the letter from the Mexican Congress, Roosevelt responded in a
manner in keeping with his Good Neighbor policyi
It is with sincere appreciation that I have received your eloquent
Statement of Secretary of State HuH, April 1, 1938, ibid., p.
2New York Times, April 2, 1938, p. 1.
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message oa behalf of the Thirty-Seventh Congress of Mexico, uniting
with me in expressing the common aspirations of the peoples of the
New World for Justice and peace, and our common determination to
solve our problems in a spirit of friendly cooperation. It is our
responsibility mutually to apply these principles of fairness and
equity to the task confronting us^ and I am confident that thereby
those tasks will be brought to a satisfactory conclusion responsive a-
lijge to the desires and interests of our respective citizens.
This optimism was hardly shared by the State Department. The Depart
ment's first reaction to the expropriation (a strong diplomatic protest and
a silver boycott) brought no important results. President Cardenas clearly
had indicated no intention of backing down in the face of rebukes from the
diplomats. If Cardenas could not be persuaded to return the oil properties,
2
the next logical step would be to make sure that he paid for them.
While Washington recognised Mexico's sovereign right to■expropriate
the property of .American citizens—provided she paid prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation—the oil companies were not interested in any settle
ment that left control of the industry in the hands of the Mexican Govern
ment. On April hs 1938, the Mexican Finance Minister^ Eduardo Suareg, told
Daniels that the oil companies very definitely were unwilling to discuss
compensation until after the outcome of their amparo proceedings against ex
propriation. The request for a court order against expropriation had been
filed that very day with the Mexican District Court.^ The unwillingness of
the companies to discuss a settlement complicated the State Department's
position in the dispute. Since the government had already recognized Mexico's
right to expropriate, it could legitimately take issue only with the amount
to Garc£as n. d. , ibid., p. 125.
u_eit<», p. 203.




and method of compensation which Mexico might offer.
On May 9th, Sumner Welles told Ambassador Najera that the Department
would be glad to transmit any Mexican offer to the companies. Since no
negotiations were in progress at the time between the Government of Mexico
and the American interests, the Department was willing, without waiving any
legal rights of the companies, to receive any concrete proposal advanced by
the Mexican Government which would indicate the precise manner in which the
Government of Mexico proposed to make effective and adequate compensation to
2
the oil companies.
A few days later, President Cardenas offered to negotiate a long-term
agreement allowing the companies to export 60 per cent of Mexico's oil out
put. From this the companies might take whatever was necessary over the next
ten years to recover the value of their expropriated properties. Cardenas
insisted firmly, however, that he would never permit the companies to regain
control over production. Daniels, who had recently returned to the United
States for belated conferences, thought the offer should be explored. He
urged Secretary Hull to win the cooperation of the American interests.
This proved to be a difficult task. On May 31st, Hull and other high
Department officials conferred with officers of Standard Oil of New Jersey*
the largest of the American firms affected by the Mexican seizure. William
S. Farish, president of Jersey's Standard, in his statement made it plain
that the Mexican offer was unacceptable %
The company attaches importance to the expropriation of its properties
^Cronon, op. eit«, p. 205
2¥elles to Najera, May 9S 1938, Foreign Relations, ?, 661a-65.
°%ronon, op. cit■», pp. 2Q6-07.
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in Mexico not because of the purely Mexican aspect of the matter but
because of its effect on other countries. Therefore, in considering any
proposal advanced for compensation by the Mexican Government, the com
pany must view it from the standpoint of its other foreign investments.
If the company accepts some arrangement which in effect is based upon
some compromise of the principles of international law, the company then
considers that it is lost since a precedent iri.ll have been established.
Other countries will follow suit and the company will not be able in
these cases to stand on the ground that if its properties are expro
priated they should be paid for at the time of taking in cash.^
When Hull inquired what would be the company's attitude should the
Mexican Government make a more reasonable offer. Parish asked in reply
whether that would give protection to other Standard Oil companies abroad.
Hull suggested that there were two alternatives open to the companies. They
could either negotiate some agreement with the Mexican Government, or let
matters drift in the hope that it might be possible to win a more favorable
settlement in the future. Farish then stated that it was his own tentative
opinion that the company would prefer to let things go than tp accept a pro-
2
posal which compromised the doctrine of compensation.
A type of watchful waiting became the companies' strategy for the next
three-and-a-half years. They were convinced that they could accept nothing
less than immediate compensation for their properties, including subsoil
rights, without jeopardising their positions in other countries. They were
certain, too, that the Mexicans could not successfully operate the oil in
dustry alone. In any event, they were determined to deal firmly with Mexico
so that no other country would be tempted to follow her lead.^
Despite the lack of willingness on the part of the companies to
■"Memorandum of Conversation by Duggan, Chief of the Division of Amer
ican Republics, May 31, 1938, Foreign Relations, ?, 75k•
2Ibid,, p. 755-
•nSronon, ppueit., p. 212.
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negotiate a settlement, the Mexican President made it known in October,
1938 that he was eager to settle the oil dispute through direct negotiations
with the oil companies. Mexico did not regard the oil expropriation as a
metter for diplomatic intervention. The position of Cardenas was that since
the oil properties were taken over under provisions in the Mexican Constitu
tion which he was bound to enforce, any discussion or negotiation on the
matter had to be done under Mexican law. The Mexican President expected the
representatives of the oil companies to come to the Mexican Government and
deal directly with it. Since the oil companies had not initiated any nego
tiations with the Mexican Government, President Cardenas urged them to do
so.1
The oil companies admitted that they were in no hurry to discuss a
settlement until after the 19U0 election on both sides of the Rio Grande.
The administration in power in Washington was committed to fostering inter-
Ameriean solidarity through its Good Neighbor policy. Consequently, its
freedom of action in dealing with Mexico was considerably limited. On the
one hand, President Cardenas made it plain that he had no intentions of re
turning the oil properties or making immediate sash compensation; and on the
other, the oil men were thoroughly convinced that, if Mexico got away with
the expropriation, there would be no Safety for their holdings in other
countries. Their strategy was to sit tight and hope for the day when a
2
chastened or disillusioned Mexican Government would invite them back.
Although the President and State Department refused to adopt a get-
York Times, October 23, 1938, p. 1.
o
Gronon, op. eit., p. 231.
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tough policy toward Mexico, there was some sentiment in Congress in favor of
one. Speaking in Congress, Senator Styles Bridges of Mew Hampshire stated
that "the clrdenas government, in March., 1938, expropriated the oil proper
ties of Americans British and Netherland citizens. Strangely enough, . . .
this action caused no general indignation . . . .wl Representative Hamilton
Fish of New York told the House:
I propose to have something to say about the good-neighbor policy in
Mexico. We are reaping the whirlwind of that good-neighbor policy,
that soft, supine policy which has worked one way, where we have been
the good neighbor and they have takes our shirts and pants, too, and
the property of our citizens, . . . and have refused to pay all these
years.2
While there was this Congressional sentiment in favor of a more force
ful policy toward Mexico, the oil companies realized that it would be dif
ficult to justify a continued refusal to discuss an oil settlement with
Mexico. This was especially true after Mexico agreed to settle the agrarian
claims in November, 1938• This settlement showed that it was possible to deal
with the Cardenas regime. It was also clear that the Roosevelt administra
tion was reluctant to intervene directly in the dispute until the companies
had made some kind of effort at a negotiated settlement. President Roose
velt agreed with Daniels that it was incumbent upon the oil men to explore
the various Mexican offers of compensation before turning to Washington for
help. In June, 1938 President Roosevelt told a Standard Oil attorney that
the companies must accept the fact of the expropriation and discuss a finan
cial settlement with Mexico. He repeated his advice six months later,
•%. S. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sesse, 1939, LXXXI?,
Part 10, 102*11.
2
U. S. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, LXXXIY,
Part U, 3806.
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the Sinclair companies agreed.
In the spring of 1939, Donald Richberg went to Mexico to begin his
negotiations with the Mexican Government. The objective of the oil com
panies was to have their expropriated properties in Mexico restored to their
ownership and control. It became evident to Richberg that the Mexican Gov
ernment could not reverse itself and simply return the properties to the oil
2
companies. This was especially true after the Mexican Supreme Court up
held, in December, 1939, the constitutionality of the Expropriation Law of
1936 and the Expropriation Decree of March 18, 1938.^ On the other hand,
Mexico would not and probably could not pay adequate compensation for the
subsoil rights to the vast oil deposits. The companies would not be satis
fied with even a fair compensation for merely their machinery and other
properties above the surface since the major values of their properties lay
in the vast oil deposits which they had discovered and developed. In the
face of these irreconcilable positions, the Richberg negotiations ended
without producing a settlement.
Throughout the Richberg negotiations, Sinclair's attorney, Patrick
Hurley, had been watching from the sidelines, alert to protect his client's
interests. He obtained a copy of the record of the conferences between
Richberg and the Mexican officials. At oae place in the record, President
Cardenas had asked where was Mr. Hurley. Riehberg replied that the big oil
2
'Donald R. Richberg, My Hero: The Indi&grget_Memoirs of an Eventful
( J7~^ ^8iibut Unheroic Life New York, 1951t ~PP^
^Daniels to Hull, December 5, 1939, Foreign Relations, V, 712.
^■Richberg, op^cit., pp.
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companies had thought it better that Hurley not participate since it would
only mean one more opinion to reconcile. Moreovers he suggested* the Sin
clair investments in Mexico were insignificant when compared with those of
the major companies and that any arrangement agreed upon between Mexico
and the major companies would have to be accepted by the Sinclair interests.
This action, as Jar as the Sinclair companies were concerned, meant the end
of the united front. Consequently, Hurley returned to Mexico alone with
determination to settle the controversy for his clients.1
After the failure of direct negotiations between Richberg and the
Mexican Government, Hull proposed, on April 3, 19U0, that the two govern
ments agree to submit to impartial arbitration all the questions involved in
the oil controversy. HuH suggested that the arbitral tribunal be given
authority to set both the amount of compensation and the means by which it
should be paid.
Mexico made its reply to Hull's arbitration proposal on May 1, 19kO.
Eduardo Hay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that Mexico was a firm
believer in the principle of arbitration and cited the Mexican record in
comparing with arbitral decisions. Hay politely reminded the United States
that it stiU had not acquiesced in the Chamisal decision of 19H, a deci
sion favorable to Mexico. Mexico declined to arbitrate the oil dispute on
the ground that it was a domestic matter.^
, op. cit,s pp. lJj.7-.U8.
Hull to Najera, April 3, 19l*0, Department of State, Bulletin. II
(April 9, 19it0), 382. J
%ay to Daniels, May 1, 19^0, Department of State, Bulletin, II (May k»
1940), U68-69. ———
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Following Mexico's refusal to arbitrate the oil dispute, Hurley-
reached an agreement between the Sinclair Company and Mexico on May 7, 19kO.
The agreement provided for payment within three years of an indemnity of
$8,000,000 for the surface properties and a long-term contract for the sale
of Mexican oil to Sinclair. The Sinclair settlement put the remaining com
panies in a particularly weak position. If one company could make a seltle-
1
ment, why not the others?
After the arbitration proposal, the State Department was inclined to
let the dispute rest for a while. Welles was noncommittal when Ambassador Na-
jera proposed, early in June, 19h0$ that the two governments each appoint a
commissioner to evaluate the remaining oil properties and determine the
method of compensation. The ambassador said that President Cardenas was will
ing to set a brief period for the deliberations and was prepared to let any
2
disagreement be settled by a neutral referee. Welles told Najera that con
sideration would be given the proposal.
One reason for the reluctance of the State Departoent to pursue an oil
settlement in June was the fact that Mexico was scheduled to elect a new
president on July 7, 19U0. Since President Cardenas was constitutionally
ineligible for re-election, there was certain to be a change. For the first
time since the Revolution, there was a well-organiged and well-financed con
servative party in the field, led by General Juan A. Alraazan. He made a
spirited bid for the anti-government vote. The oil men and most foreign
businessmen in Mexico were confident that he would prove much easier to deal
Tliehberg, op. cit., pp. 265-66.
2
Cronon, op. cit., p. 25k•
Wood, op. eit., p. 2i;7.
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with than the government party's candidate, General Manuel Avila Gamacho.
Shortly before the election^ JUjna^an threatened to lead a revolt if h© were
cheated out of what he regarded as certain victory.
The election was marked by violence and intimidation on both sides.
The Aluagan forces refused to submit their ballots for tabulation. Whenj as
a result, General Gamacho was proclaimed the winner, Almassam angrily left
2
toe country.
After Avila Gamaeho had been officially certified as the victor, the
United States Government on several occasions went out of its way to demon
strate that Washington did not question his election. The White House an
nounced that Vice President-elect Henry A. Wallace would head the United
States delegation at the inauguration of Camacho. This decision was viewed
in both countries &b proof that the United States accepted the election re
sults and was eager for closer relations with the Camacho Government.
Even before the inauguration of Camacho, Welles approached Najera with
the suggestion that the two governments quietly explore the possibility of a
general settlement of all pending claims and disputes. World Mar II had
broken out in Europe and, throughout the first half of 19klt the two coun
tries moved closer toward an understanding on defense matters. The United
States quietly contracted to buy Mexico's output of eleven strategic miner
als.*4 On April 1, 19U1, Welles and Nljera signed an agreement pledging the
right of transit and the use of air fields for military aircraft of both







By the summer of 19lil, the oil dispute was the chief remaining ob
stacle to a general settlement with Mexico. The United States Government
was eager to bring the oil dispute to a close because it hoped that such
an accord would open the way to closer cooperation on defense matters and
would aid in the promotion of hemispheric solidarity and security. Early
in July, Na'jera repeated his suggestion that each government appoint an ex
pert to evaluate the oil properties. With this suggestion as a starting
pointy the two governments were soon able to draw up a tentative oil agree-
2
ment.
By August, 19Ul, the United States and the Mexican Governments approv
ed a tentative formula for an oil settlement. Hull held a meeting with
American oil company representatives in his office on September 27, 19^1.and
laid this proposed settlement before them. He sought to bring about its
acceptance byibutlining to them the world situation and the important role
Mexico could play in cooperation with the United States. The Secretary of
State stressed the Axis activities which were then being conducted in Latin
.America and the help which Mexico had already given this country in prevent
ing strategic materials from going to Japan. President Camacho, Hull point
ed out, had adopted policies affording a timely opportunity to work out all
problems harmonious^.^
In response to the proposed settlement, the company representatives
U. S. Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 19hls LXXXvU.
Part 3, 29&7-B9.
2
Gronon, op. cit., p. 263.
^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 191*8), II,
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objected, asserting that the United States was sacrificing the principle;, of
property rights. The oil men declared that they would rgther see the
question remain unsettledj even with the result of losing the property, than
to see the principle of property rights sacrificed.1
Failing to reach an agreement in September, Hull had further meetings
and exchanges of conversation with the oil company heads in October and No
vember without being able to secure their acceptance of the proposed settle
ment. Knowing what he did about the dangerous status of United States' nego
tiations with Japan, Hull felts as did President Roosevelt and Ambassador
Daniels, that the United States could wait no longer. On the afternoon of
November 19, 191+1, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Najera met at the State
?
Department and signed the long-desired global settlement.
Under the global settlement, agreements were reached on?; (1) expro
priation of petroleum properties of Imerican nationals, (2) claims,
(3) trade, (k) stabilization of the Mexican peso, (5) Mexican silver, and
(6) financing of Mexican highway construction.1^
The agreement on the expropriated American oil properties provided
that the two governments appoint an expert to determine the just compensa
tion to be paid the American owners for their properties and rights and in
terests. If the American and Mexican experts agreed on the amount to be
paid, they were to render a joint report to their two Governments within five
months. If the experts were unable to reach an agreement, they were to sub
mit a separate report to their respective governments within 30 days. Upon
"hhid.
2Ibid.
^Summary of the Agreements, November 19, 19i*l, Department of State,
Bulletin, V (November 22, 191*1), 3994*03.
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receipt of such report, the two governments would seek through diplomatic
negotiations to determine the amount of compensation to be paid. At the
time of signing, the Mexican Government made a cash deposit of 19,000,000
on account as eompensation to be paid the affected American companies and
interests.
By the claims convention, the Mexican Government agreed to pay the
United States the sum of $l;0,000,000 in full settlement of other outstand
ing property claims, including the hitherto unsettled so-called General
Claims and the agrarian claims (on which $3,000,000 had been paid to date on
those arising between August 30, 1927 and October 7, 19^0). Mexico agreed
to make a payment of $3,000,000 at the time of exchange of ratifications of
the convention. The balance remaining due to the United States amounted to
$31**000,000 after the $3,000,000 payment when ratifications were exchanged,
and it was to be liquidated over a period of more than a decade through the
2
annual payment by Mexico of $2,500,000, beginning in 19^2.
Other aspects of the comprehensive settlement were designed to promote
Mexican-American harmony and cooperation. As the two governments decided in
principle to negotiate a reciprocal-trade agreement, the Treasury Department
entered into an agreement for monetary and financial cooperation with the
Mexican Government and the Bank of Mexico which provided for the purchase of
Mexican pesos with United States dollars. This would be to the mutual bene
fit and advantage of the two countries, since United States dollars thus
acquired by the Mexican authorities would greatly assist them in stabilizing




Department also indicated its willingness to purchase newly mined Mexican
silver directly from the Mexican Government on a basis similar to that under
which such purchases were made prior to 1938. Finally, the Export-Import
Bank agreed to accept certain highway bonds of the Mexican Government as
security for credit. This was done as a means of expediting Mexico's high
way construction program. The Mexican highway system is a most important
part of the Iater-imeriean Highway.
The signing of the comprehensive agreements by the two countries mark
ed a milestone of great importance in United States-Mexican relations. Am
bassador Daniels considered November 19, 19lil significant enough in the
relations of the two countries to write that it "might go down in the annals
2
of Mexico and the United States as the Day of Deliverance." Henry Morgen
thau, United States Secretary of the Treasury, and Eduardo Suarez, Mexican
Finance Minister, saw the agreements as "practical evidence of the Good
Neighbor Policy."^ Secretary of State Cordell Hull adequately expressed the
importance of the agreements in his press statement on November 19th:
The agreements which the United States and Mexico have reached today
are of outstanding importance in the relations between the two countries.
Not only do they concern most of the principal mutual problems which have
long been pending between the two sister republics but they mark a new
milestone of great importance in the cause of increasingly closer colla
boration and solidarity between the countries of the New World. These
agreements constitute a further concrete proof of the fact that problems
existing between nations are capable of mutually satisfactory settlement
when approached in a reciprocal spirit of good will, tolerance, and a
desire to understand each other's point of view.S
2
Daniels, op. cit., p. 266.
^Joint Statements by Morgenthau and Suarez, November 19, 19ljl,
Documents, I?, 360.
^Statement by Hull, November 19, 19hl} ibid., p. 357.
CONCLUSION
The Mexican Revolution of 1910, launched under the leadership of
Jraneiseo I. Madero, had as its immediate objective the restoration of con
stitutional liberties which had been suppressed during the long regime of
Porfirio Diaa. As the Revolution advanced* the underlying movement of the
rural folk gradually submerged all else and subordinated all other issues
to the basic one of land for the people. The aims of the Revolution shift
ed to emphasis on the effort to improve the lot of the peasants and workers
in Mexico. A prerequisite for such improvement was Mexican recovery of the
control of the important elements of Mexico's resources which had passed
into the possession of foreigners.
In attempting to achieve the aims of the Revolution^ the leaders of
Mexico created a byproduct of problems and issues that were to plague
United States- Mexican relations. The most outstanding of these issues
during the period from 1933 to 19l*l were those growing out of the general
and special claims and the expropriation of American land and oil proper
ties.
TOiile seeking to bring about a solution to these problems, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had to back up
their Good Neighbor policy in their dealings with Mexico. They knew that it
was still on probation among the Latin American countries. Strong and ad
verse action against Mexico might have led to a complete break in the United
States-Mexican diplomatic relations. At the same time, it would have
u
77
possibly alienated forever the growing but shaky latin American trust in
the United States. By the adoption of the Good Neighbor policy, the United
States gave up the practice of forceful intervention in order to protect
American properties in Latin America. Consequently, diplomatic persuasion
was about its only remaining weapon.
The claims controversy gave the United States an opportunity to apply
the Good Neighbor policy in its dealings with Mexico. One result of the
Bucareli Conference of 1923 was the establishment of two claims commissions
of mixed membership. As late as 1923, the two claims commissions had made
little progress toward a settlement of the claims issue. However, with the
skillful application of the Good Neighbor policy hj Josephus Daniels, United
States Ambassador to Mexico, the two countries were able to reach an agree
ment on both the general and special claims problem in April, 193h>
Within the same year that the claims agreement was reached, the Mexi
can Government, under the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, accelerated the
program of expropriating the land holdings of "American citizens in Mexico.
This program had as its purpose the improvement of the conditions of peasants
in Mexico. From the start of the land-reform program, the United States con
sistently held that, while Mexico had the right to expropriate private pro
perty, no American-owned land should be taken unless prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation was made. The United States had a particular desire
to safeguard friendship with Mexico not only because Mexico is one of its
nearest neighbors but also because of the many ways in which good and friend
ly relations between the two countries could be complementary and mutually
beneficial. In view of this fact, friendly negotiations, in keeping with
the Good Neighbor policy, culminated in a settlement of the agrarian claims
in November, 1938.
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The land expropriation controversy was mild in comparison with the
one which grew out of Mexico !s expropriation of .American oil properties in
Mexico. When expropriation was decreed on March 18, 1938, it was the
climax of a labor dispute between the petroleum labor union and seventeen
oil companies. The companies refused to accept the award of the Mexican
Federal Board of Arbitration and Conciliation which was confirmed by the
Mexican Supreme Court.
The first reaction of the State Department to expropriation was a sil
ver boycott and a diplomatic protest which was toned down by .Ambassador
Daniels. While this action failed to make President Cardenas rescind his
Expropriation Decree of March 18th, it was at least a warning to other Latin
American governments. Prom the start, as in the case of the agrarian ex
propriations, the United States recognised Mexico's right to expropriate the
oil properties of .American citizens provided she compensated promptly. Hav
ing recognized Mexico's right to expropriate, the Government of the United
States could legitimately take issue only with the amount and method of com
pensation which Mexico might offer.
While President Cardenas made it plain that he had no intention of re
turning the oil properties or making immediate cash compensation, he stressed
the fact that he was eager to reach a settlement of the oil dispute through
direct negotiations with the oil companies. Mexico did not consider the oil
expropriation as a matter for diplomatic intervention. The position of
Cardenas was that the oil properties were taken under provisions of the Mex
ican Constitution which he was bound to enforce and that any discussion or
negotiation of the matter had to be under Mexican law.
The American oil companies, especially the major ones, were not in
terested in any settlement that left control of the industry in the hands of
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the Mexican Government. They were convinced that they could accept nothing
less than immediate compensation for their properties, including subsoil
rights, without jeopardizing their positions in other countries.
President Roosevelt agreed with Daniels that it was incumbent upon the
oil men to explore the ■various Mexican offers of compensation before turning
to Washington for help. In June, 1938, Roosevelt told a Standard Oil attor
ney that the companies must accept the fact of expropriation and discuss a
formal settlement with Mexico. Ihe President repeated his advice six months
later, warning that he would not enter the controversy until the oil men had
first tried to get an acceptable agreement. Roosevelt thought that a fair
settlement should be based on the companies' actual investments in Mexico
not their estimates of potential profits.
After the failure of the companies to reach a settlement through their
representative Donald Richberg, the State Department began negotiations look
ing toward a general settlement of all pending claims and disputes. Ihe
United States Government was eager to bring the oil dispute to a close be
cause it hoped that such an accord would open the way to closer cooperation
on defense matters and would aid in the promotion of hemispheric solidarity
and security. By August, ±9kl} the two governments had reached a tentative
formula for an oil settlement, as well as agreements on other matters. Hull
sought to get the companies to accept the tentative formula but was unsuc
cessful. Knowing the world situation in 19Ul and realizing the important
role Mexico could play in cooperation with the United States in defense mat
ters, Hull felt, as did President Roosevelt and Ambassador Daniels, that the
United States could wait no longer on the companies to accept the proposed
oil agreement. Therefore, he and the Mexican Ambassador Najera signed the
global settlement on November 19,
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By applying the Good Neighbor doctrine in its relations with Mexico*
the United States and Mexico were able to exchange notes outlining a com
prehensive settlement of claims and disputes which had been pending for
some time. The general agreement marked a milestone of great importance in
the cause of closer collaboration and solidarity between the two nations as
well as with the other countries of the New World. They,, moreover^ con
stituted concrete proof that problems which exist between nations are cap
able of mutually satisfactory settlement whea approached in the spirit and
manner that characterised the Good Neighbor policy of the United States.
Thus by the end of 19^1, Mexican-American harmony had been achieved.
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